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This dissertation consists of three independent research papers, tied under a broad
research agenda of “human capital” in India. Chapters 1 and 2 are closely related
and both utilize a self-collected, primary dataset on the subjective beliefs, of a sample
of 12th grade students, regarding factors that may influence their decision to invest
in post-secondary education. Chapter 3 examines a different dimension of human
capital and investigates the role of agriculture in improving the nutritional status of
rural, Indian women.
In the first paper, I examine the inaccuracy of students’ beliefs regarding the labor
market returns (i.e. wage earnings) associated with post-secondary (college) educa-
tion. Towards this end, I randomize information on measured population wages to a
sample of 12th grade students, drawn from schools affiliated with a large public state
university in India, who at the time were roughly six months away from making a
decision regarding college attendance and college track (technical, academic, voca-
tional) conditional on attendance. I find that, at baseline, students beliefs about pop-
ulation earnings deviate substantially from true earnings in the population. Upon the
receipt of potentially new information, students revise beliefs regarding own-wages
in the direction of the information, though the average extent of updating is small
and masks substantial sub-group heterogeneity. Additionally, subsequent changes in
enrollment intentions and intentions to borrow for higher education are in line with
both the extent and direction of wage belief updating. A portion of the heterogeneity
in wage belief updating can be explained by initial misperceptions regarding popu-
lation earnings, and baseline relevance of earnings to enrollment intentions. Yet a
large portion remains unexplained, consistent with wide heterogeneity in updating
heuristics, at the individual level. From a policy standpoint, these findings point to
the limited capacity of information campaigns based on population-level aggregates
to induce, on average, large changes in individual priors and help to rationalize a
number of recent papers that find heterogeneous impacts of information provision on
education outcomes.
In my second paper, I draw descriptive insights about the extent and implications of
the same sample of 12th grade students’ misperceptions about post-secondary (col-
lege) expenses, elicited 5-9 months prior to them completing high school. Students’
subjective beliefs about post-secondary expenses are compared to a reference distri-
bution of actual expenses incurred by students of post-secondary education. Stu-
dents overestimate expenses for two out of three tracks. I estimate that if students
perceived expenses more accurately, then their perceived affordability for technical
tracks and general tracks would increase by 10 percentage points and 55 percentage
points, respectively. Students’ have relatively more accurate beliefs about the ex-
penses associated with their utility maximizing track or their most preferred track,
which I estimate using a flexible model of track-choice. Nevertheless, I show that
purging cost beliefs of errors, also increases the perceived affordability of students’
preferred tracks by an economically and statistically large magnitude.
My third paper is co-authored with Dr. Prabhu Pingali. In this paper, we estab-
lish a statistically important relationship between household agricultural income and
maternal BMI using a five-year panel dataset of agricultural households drawn from
18 villages across five Indian states. Using within household variation over time, we
estimate both, the extent to which short-term changes in agricultural income are
associated with short-term changes in BMI, and the effect of agricultural income
growth on BMI growth over a longer term. Over the longer term, and for the group
of households that regularly farm, we find a 10 pp. agriculture income growth to
be associated with a 0.15 pp. growth in BMI. Consistent with the literature, this
effect is economically modest, but important considering that we do not find a cor-
responding effect for growth in non-agricultural income. We present evidence to
suggest that the own-production of food is not an important pathway for nutritional
improvements, but the agricultural income effect is likely operational through pur-
chase of food, specifically of protein rich pulses. Effects of agricultural income are
stronger for younger women, in the age-group 15-25 years, who face a particularly
strong nutritional disadvantage in India.
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CHAPTER 1
INFORMATION, HETEROGENEOUS UPDATING & HIGHER
EDUCATION DECISIONS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM
INDIA
1.1 Introduction
Providing information on the returns to education in the labor market is generally
seen as a powerful demand-side tool to encourage human capital accumulation. The
hypothesis that parents and their children might underestimate sizeable returns to
education in the labor market, and hence under invest in education, makes infor-
mation provision a compelling and cost-effective intervention. Encouraging results
from Nguyen (2008) & Jensen (2010), who find that randomizing information to a
sample of students increased average schooling attainment and school attendance at
a basic level of schooling, have spurred a significant literature examining information
interventions in education. A substantial focus of the recent literature (Oreopoulos
and Dunn (2013); Wiswall and Zafar (2015b); Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman
(2015); Pekkala Kerr et al. (2015)) has been in the context of post-secondary educa-
tion, where premiums vary dramatically by degree and institution, and the focus of
policy-makers has been to minimize the extent to which misinformation may lead to
sub-optimal decisions, which includes enrollment on account of over estimating the
net-returns to certain degree-college tracks vis-a-vis others.
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By and large, the emergent literature on information interventions in education has
been equivocal in it’s findings. While some studies do find information to be effective
on average1, others document only a subset of the overall sample responding to the
information in some manner, or not at all (Fryer Jr (2013); Loyalka et al. (2013);
Avitabile and De Hoyos Navarro (2015); Pekkala Kerr et al. (2015); Bonilla, Bottan
and Ham (2016)). Low average effectiveness of information interventions have mostly
been explained by examining why certain groups of individuals may not be able to
act on newly acquired information. For instance, Fryer Jr (2013) suggests that in-
formation on returns may have increased students intrinsic effort to do better but
not real outcomes like test-scores because students may not know how to translate
effort into output. In the context of a similar model, Avitabile and De Hoyos Navarro
(2015) also find better learning outcomes among high-income individuals, on account
of being exposed to information, as these individuals are plausibly in a better posi-
tion to translate effort into output. Affordability/credit constraints have also been
suggested to be binding in Bonilla, Bottan and Ham (2016) who find only a response
on the intensive margin of enrollment (towards more selective tracks), driven by the
relatively richer sub-group.
In this paper, I offer another explanation for why the provision of population-level
information on returns may lead to highly heterogeneous (final) outcomes, by exam-
1For instance Oreopoulos and Dunn (2013) find that providing information on mean earnings
differences between those who complete high school and those who have college degrees along with
access to a financial aid calculator, leads students to revise upwards the expected earnings from
college relative to high school and makes them more likely to state college attendance. Hastings,
Neilson and Zimmerman (2015) provide highly customized degree and institution specific informa-
tion to individuals, adapted to their individual enrollment intentions, and find low SES individuals
to enroll in degrees with higher net earnings.
2
ining in detail the first-link in the causal chain that links population-level information
to education outcomes, that is, the extent to which individuals update own-earnings
beliefs in response to receiving information about population-level averages. Hetero-
geneity in this case depends on (a) the extent to which individuals are misinformed
about population earnings to begin with and (b) the degree to which new informa-
tion on population earnings is relevant to individual’s own earnings beliefs. By and
large papers in the literature either do not systematically collect information on the
impact of information on own belief updating (Fryer Jr (2013);Pekkala Kerr et al.
(2015)) or do not establish heterogeneous outcomes between sub-groups over and
above homogeneous updating in own-beliefs (Loyalka et al. (2013); Avitabile and
De Hoyos Navarro (2015); Bonilla, Bottan and Ham (2016)).
In a framed field experiment (Harrison and List (2004)), I study the role of informa-
tion provision on own-earnings beliefs, stated enrollment and borrowing intentions,
in a setting which abstracts away from both affordability and eligibility constraints.
More specifically, I examine the impact of an experiment that provides information
to high-school students on the distribution of post-secondary, track-specific popu-
lation earnings. The impact of the experiment is measured by students updating
of own wage beliefs contingent on pursuing each post-secondary track, and their
stated probability of enrollment across tracks. Borrowing intentions are measured for
higher-education attendance and are not elicited as a track-specific decision. Wage
beliefs and enrollment intentions were elicited for (potentially) hypothetical choice-
sets where all tracks were available to all individuals. Surveyed students were 5-9
3
months away from making an actual post-secondary education enrollment decision
and were therefore likely to be thinking more actively about their post-secondary
education status. The experiment was carried out with 12th grade students drawn
from constituent schools of a large, public, state university in India and provided
earnings information conditional on three post-secondary tracks- technical, general,
vocational- and information conditional on not pursuing post-secondary education.
Students in this sample have substantially biased beliefs about population earnings at
baseline2. Moreover, at baseline, earnings are a statistically important determinant
of enrollment intentions. Despite this the average impact of information provision
is small. This is the case even when commonly cited binding constraints like credit
availability and eligibility for enrollment are not directly constraining students. In
the current setting, the small average impact of information on own-wage belief up-
dating and hence subsequent decisions, stems from highly heterogeneous updating
of own-wage beliefs. Heterogeneity is examined by students’ current subject stream
of study, an important predictor of post-secondary education in the Indian context
and also the dimension along which the survey sample was stratified. For one group
of students (students in Arts/Humanities) own-wage belief updating, changes in en-
rollment intentions and treatment-control differences in borrowing intentions are all
statistically insignificant. The second group of students (students in the Commerce
stream), revise own-earnings beliefs for attendance tracks, relative to non-attendance,
2While I do not examine the formation of earnings expectations here, Maertens (2011) indicates
that in her sample from rural India, individuals’ information sets regarding earnings are positively
influenced by the frequency with which information is received via media outlets and from schools,
on the number of educated people known and on the respondent’s own education.
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downwards by a large and highly statistically significant magnitude. This is driven by
a large, downward revisions for wage-beliefs conditional on attendance tracks and no
statistically significant revision for beliefs conditional on the non-attendance track.
This group of students state lower likelihood of enrollment relative to non-enrollment
and treatment individuals are not any more likely to borrow than control ones. The
final group of students (students in the Science stream), revise own-earnings beliefs
for attendance tracks, relative to non-attendance, upwards, and this is driven by a
large, downward revision for the non-attendance track and no statistically discernible
updating for the attendance tracks. This group of students state higher likelihood
of enrollment relative to non-enrollment and treatment individuals are much more
likely to borrow than control ones. Therefore, two sub-groups of students, Commerce
and Science, update attendance earnings, relative to non-attendance, in opposite di-
rections. These patterns are indicative of systematic updating behavior because
enrollment and borrowing intentions for the two sub-groups are in line with the di-
rection of wage belief updating. Moreover, within these sub-groups, the same set
of individuals seem to be driving both wage belief updating and revisions regarding
enrollment intentions.
What explains this differential updating on account of the receipt of the same in-
formation? Arts students have at baseline a small and statistically insignificant
elasticity of enrollment to wage beliefs. At baseline they also make smaller errors, on
average, with regards to beliefs about population earnings. However, these factors
do not explain differential updating on the part of Commerce & Science students.
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Ex-ante, these students have a statistically important and similar in magnitude elas-
ticity of enrollment to wage beliefs- therefore earnings likely play an important role in
their decisions for future education. Importantly, I establish that differential updat-
ing for these two groups of students cannot be established on account of differences
in baseline errors, regarding population wages, between the groups. Both groups of
students have statistically identical baseline errors for all four tracks. This indicates
that at the individual level heuristics relating beliefs regarding population earnings
to own-earnings are highly varied and undermine the extent to which information
campaigns based on population aggregates might be effective on average. Consistent
with predictions of belief-based models of Bayesian updating, I find some suggestive
evidence to support that individuals with stronger likelihoods to pursue a track are
less likely to update earnings beliefs for that track, compared to individuals with
weaker likelihoods at baseline. However, in the absence of data on individuals’ vari-
ance of their prior beliefs, I cannot rule out that a portion of the non-response to
information may also be non-Bayesian in nature. However, some insights from the
literature indicate that this is a possibility. Wiswall and Zafar (2015b), examine
the extent to which individual-level updating of beliefs deviates from the Bayesian
benchmark. Given each individual’s prior belief and variance of their prior belief,
they construct a Bayesian benchmark for every individual and then use data on
their actual posteriors to classify deviants from the benchmark. They document a
wide range of updating heuristics among respondents; nearly a fifth of their sample
comprises of “Non-Updaters”, in the non-Bayesian sense. Among those who update,
while the most common heuristic is within the band of Bayesian updating, a sub-
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stantial portion of the sample is more Conservative in their updating and up to 12-19
percent of the respondents update in the Opposite (“Contrary”) direction.
To summarize, in this paper, I establish that heterogeneity in the updating of own-
wage beliefs in response to population-level information is important and drives sig-
nificant differences in decision-making between sub-groups in the sample. A large
part of this updating is unexplained by initial differences in misperceptions regard-
ing population earnings. Some suggestive evidence indicates that this differential
behavior is consistent with predictions of the Bayesian model, but we cannot rule
the extent to which non-Bayesian behavior may account for these findings. However
the literature suggests that the latter is likely to play an important role and merits
further investigation. In this paper, reference to differential updating heuristics indi-
cates both variation in updating consistent with the Bayesian model (i.e. on account
differential variance of prior beliefs) and non-Bayesian updating.
Campaigns designed to provide earnings information based on population level ag-
gregates are attractive to policy-makers. For instance, based on Jensen (2010)’s
influential study, the Mexican Secretariat of Public Education implemented an in-
tervention to provide students entering 10th grade with information about the returns
to high-school and tertiary education, with an aim to improve on-time graduation
and learning outcomes (Avitabile and De Hoyos Navarro (2015)). A major appeal
to information interventions are also their potential for being cost-effective3. For
3Cost-effectiveness analysis accessed on J-PAL’s website at:
https://www.povertyactionlab.org/policy-lessons/education/improving-student-participation
show that information provision is more cost-effective than merit scholarships and cash transfers.
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a policy-maker looking to implement an information campaign to encourage more
optimal education decision making, these findings are not encouraging because they
highlight that the heterogeneity by which individuals apply population-level infor-
mation as relevant to themselves is important. Therefore, even if a policy-maker
has accurate knowledge about the direction and magnitude of baseline errors re-
garding population wages, for a particular group, they may not be able to induce
large changes, on average, in individual’s beliefs about themselves. More detailed
data on earnings conditional on different types of education (as is available in Chile
(Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman (2015)), Finland (Pekkala Kerr et al. (2015)) &
Colombia (Bonilla, Bottan and Ham (2016)) and for different groups of individuals
(like the National Survey of College Graduates in the U.S.) may help in the design of
more specific information interventions which may provide more informative signals
to different groups of individuals. However, currently, in most developing countries,
such information is not systematically collected.
The primary contribution of this study is to the literature that evaluates the poten-
tial of information policies and campaigns to influence education decision-making.
However, it’s findings can also throw light in other areas of economics where ag-
gregate information is used to influence individual decision-making. Some exam-
ples include the use of information in impacting occupation choice (Osman (2014)),
sexual-behaviors (Dupas (2011)) and migration decisions (Shrestha (2016)). The
results on the demand for borrowing as a result of information provision in this
paper, speak to an important strand in the large literature on higher education ac-
However, only one study on information provision is used as reference
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cess, which focuses on borrowing constraints (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008);
Delavande and Zafar (2014); Kaufmann (2014)). In principal, individuals who would
like to borrow at the going interest-rate but are unable to gain credit are classified to
be credit-constrained. However, being credit-constrained depends on each individu-
als net-return calculation from education, which itself may suffer from information
gaps. In my study, the fraction of the sample which revises expected earnings from
post-secondary attendance, relative to non-attendance, upwards is also more likely
to state an increased intentions to borrow. Therefore, to the extent that the link be-
tween information provision and own-wage beliefs is present, information can affect
behavior to lift more binding barriers to education access.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 1.2 briefly discusses aspects of
post-secondary education in India, section 1.3 outlines a conceptual framework to
motivate sources of heterogeneity in own-wage belief updating, section 1.4 discusses
data and experimental details, section 1.5 is devoted to results, section 1.6 entails a
discussion on factors that explain (or fail to) heterogeneous updating in the sample
and the final section concludes.
1.2 Post-Secondary Education in India
I study the decision-making of students between three post-secondary tracks and the
non-attendance alternative. After the completion of high school, students choose
whether or not to attend post-secondary education and what type of post-secondary
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education to enroll in. I classify post-secondary education into three “attendance
tracks”- technical/professional degrees, general academic degrees and vocational
diploma or certificate courses. This is also how the Government of India classi-
fies higher education tracks in its collection of post-secondary education data as part
of the National Sample Surveys (NSS) and this is the lowest level of aggregation at
which nationally representative earnings data is available in India.
Each higher education track studied in this paper lies at distinct points of the net-
return spectrum from post-secondary education in India. The three attendance
track are also distinct in the type of educational content they impart and have
distinct labor-market implications. Technical degree courses include professional de-
grees in fields like medicine, engineering and architecture as well as job-oriented de-
grees like Bachelors of Computer Application, Business Administration, Information-
Technology (IT), Pharmacy or Hotel Management. These courses are offered both
by government and private institutions and are regulated by the All-India Council
for Technical Education (AICTE). General degree courses are non-technical and
award a bachelors degree in either the arts, sciences or commerce, further catego-
rized according to subject. Mostly, these are offered by the government via central
or state level universities and colleges. Vocational courses are not academic and
focus on imparting a set of skills (rather than broader academic knowledge) tar-
geted towards employment in a specific sector. They are offered by both government
and private institutes. Under the government, these courses are offered either by
Industrial Training Institutes/Centers (ITI/ITC) or by Polytechnics.
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Recent reports of the NSS 71st round on education expenses, estimates the aver-
age yearly costs for technical/professional degrees to be a little over 60,000 rupees
(approx. 1,000 dollars) with the expenditure on private institutions being 1.5-2.5
times the cost of government institutes. Average yearly expenses for a general ed-
ucation, in contrast, were found to be around 10,000 rupees (approx. 150 dollars)
and for vocational courses, around 30,000 rupees (approximately 450 dollars). Mea-
sured wage premiums for technical degrees are more than a 100% of the wages of
those who complete high school. Despite the fact that vocational training is more
expensive than general degree courses, wage premiums for vocational courses (42%
of high-school wage) are around 8 percentage points lower than the wage premiums
for general courses.
Another feature of higher education in India is that students study in a specific
subject-stream during 11th and 12th grades. This is the case in the current sam-
ple and is also true nationally. Typically, there are three subject streams: (1)
Arts/Humanities, (2) Commerce and (3) Science. As is discussed subsequently, stu-
dents’ current stream of study is expected to be strongly correlated with future
post-secondary education choice on account of preferences, with regards to eligibility
for specific courses or degrees within tracks and also, and also on account of ability
(measured by test-scores) and socio-economic status (SES). In this paper, we discuss
heterogeneity in the impact of the treatment, by students’ current stream of study,
because a-priori, we expect that students from different streams would have different
baseline intentions of pursuing different tracks. In section 1.5.2, we further discuss
11
correlates of students current stream of study to frame our findings.
1.3 Conceptual Framework
I discuss here a simple model of belief updating proposed in Wiswall and Zafar
(2015b) which is useful to frame the set-up, analysis and findings of this paper.
The model highlights that students update beliefs about their own-earnings, upon
receiving information about population earnings if (1) they are misinformed about
populations earnings and (2) their beliefs about their own earnings are linked to their
beliefs about population earnings. Additionally, the function that links population
earnings beliefs to own earnings beliefs, known as the updating function, varies at
the level of the individual, and matters in determining both the direction and extent
to which individuals update beliefs.
Let Xit be individual i
′s expectation at time t about her own earnings at some future
date, denoted X and let Ωit denote i
′s information set at time t. Prior to receiving
information, in the pre-stage, respondent i reports her beliefs about self earnings as:
Xit = E(X|Ωit) =
∫
XdGi(X|Ωit) = fi(Ωit) (1.1)
where Gi(X|Ωit) is individual i′s belief about the distribution of future earnings
conditional on the information Ωit. fi(.) is the updating function that provides the
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mapping between the individual’s information set to beliefs about own-earnings at
some future date.
An individual’s information set has two parts: Ωit = {Iit, Bit}. Here, let Iit be
individual i′s current belief about the information we provide in our treatment-
average track-specific post-secondary education earnings in the Indian population.
Bit contains all other elements of an individual’s information set which includes
both other population-level information and private information available only to
the individual like her perceived ability to succeed in a particular track. After the
provision of information, in the post-stage, the individual’s information set is Ωit+1.
At this stage, we also elicit her beliefs about her own-earnings at a future Xit+1,
again.
Two conditions are necessary for an individual to update their beliefs about their
own earnings and for Xit 6= Xit+1:
1. Iit 6= Iit+1 and the individual should not already know the information that we
provide. Therefore the information should be new and also accepted by the
individual as credible.
2. fi(Ωit) 6= fi(Ωit+1) and the individual should consider the population-level
information as relevant to themselves.
If we observe that individuals at baseline have beliefs about population earnings
that are substantially different from the information we provide, then condition 1 is
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met and the information provided is likely “new” to the individuals in the sample.
If individuals do not update own-earnings beliefs, despite the information being new,
i.e. ∂fi(Ωit+1)
∂Iit
= 0, then the general rules stated above imply that the new information
was not relevant to them. A more specific model of the process of belief updating
discussed above is Bayesian updating, the benchmark model for analyzing belief up-
dating, which imposes specific restrictions on the fi(.) function in Equation 1.1. In
our case, a modification of Bayesian updating applies because individuals receive
information over one variable (population earnings) and update beliefs regarding
a separate variable (own earnings). In this Quasi-Bayesian case, updated earnings
(XBit+1) are a linear combination of an individual’s prior beliefs (Xit) and new in-
formation about population earnings (Iit+1), wherein the relative weight placed on
the new information is the variance of the prior belief V (Xit) divided by the vari-
ance of the new information V (Iit+1), i.e.
V (Xit)
V (Iit+1)
. Therefore, a core prediction of
the Bayesian model of updating is that individuals are more responsive to informa-
tion regarding a quantity that they have weaker priors about (i.e. higher V (Xit))
(DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010)).
In this paper, we utilize the core prediction of the Bayesian model to rationalize dif-
ferential updating between individuals with identical information sets. V (Iit+1) is the
same for all individuals as the same track-specific information is provided to every-
one, and therefore, variation in responsiveness to information stems from differences
in the variance of prior beliefs. However, this evidence is suggestive because we do
not directly measure individuals’ variance of baseline priors and a body of literature
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in economics and psychology documents deviations in individual updating compared
to what the Bayesian model would predict (Kahneman and Tversky (1972); Wiswall
and Zafar (2015b)). Therefore, while we cannot fully explain the nature of differential
updating, we do establish that the direction and magnitude of baseline population
errors cannot explain a significant portion of own-belief updating. In other words,
the heterogeneity in individual-level updating is important. We show that this is
the case by highlighting differential updating of own-earnings beliefs for sub-groups
with statistically identical baseline-errors. The documented differential updating of
own-earnings beliefs also has important consequence for the manner in which these
sub-groups update enrollment probabilities and borrowing intentions- decisions that
take updated own-earnings beliefs as inputs. This points to the limited potential for
an information campaign to induce updating of individual beliefs despite accurate
knowledge of information gaps in a particular population.
1.4 Data & Experiment Details
1.4.1 Data collection & Timing
The data for this study was collected from a sample of 1525 students across nine
public schools in the East Indian state of Jharkhand. All nine schools are con-
stituent units of a large state university and the students, at the time of the survey,
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were studying in in their 12th grade.4 Four of the nine schools are situated in the
capital city of Ranchi, one in a rural block of Ranchi district and four others are
in surrounding rural districts. The survey was conducted between October 2014
and February 2015, five-nine months prior to the time when students make actual
decisions regarding enrollment in post-secondary education.
Figure 1.A.1 highlights the structure of the survey. Half of the complete sample
was randomly assigned to the information treatment group and the other half to
the control group. The sample was also stratified by gender and current stream
of study to ensure equal representation of the two sets of groups across treatment
and control (Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer (2007)). We drew, approximately, an
equal number of students from each school. Further, within each school, students
were randomly assigned to survey-sessions of 15 students each. Survey sessions were
either a control session or a treatment session, with the latter differing only on
account of the feature that it included an approximately 20 minute long information
session, at the end of the collection of baseline data and disbursal of loan cards. For a
given survey-session, round 2 of data collection was conducted the day after the first
round.5 In every school, both rounds of all control sessions were conducted before the
4Specifically, these students were studying in the final year of their “intermediate degree” in
what are known as “intermediate colleges”. After completing 10th grade, students chose between
attending either an intermediate college, for two years of higher-secondary schooling, or attending
a high school which offers 11th and 12th grades. Public intermediate colleges, like the ones surveyed
here, are often co-located with public colleges offering undergraduate degrees. Since intermediate
education is equivalent to higher secondary education, I refer to these students as being in 12th
grade, throughout the paper, to avoid confusing terminology as most people think of colleges as
referring to only post-secondary education.
5The short time-period between round 1 and round 2 of the survey follows from the research
designs of Wiswall and Zafar (2015a) and Osman (2014). The short-time span between rounds
allows one to be sure that all other factors in an individuals utility function that are correlated
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treatment survey-sessions, in order to prevent students from the treatment group to
share information with students in the control group, in a manner that can influence
the results of this paper. Both sets of students answered exactly the same round
1 and round 2 questions. Survey sessions were conducted in classrooms within the
students school and were led by a team of two enumerators. Students answered the
questions, posed by the enumerators, on android tablets. The questionnaires were
fielded using Open Data Kit (ODK) software.
1.4.2 Survey Questionnaire & Information Treatment
Round 1 of the survey consisted of questions on (i) socio-economic details including
gender, caste, religion, a household assets module, parental education and occupa-
tion, older sibling gender and education, scores on previous centralized board exam-
inations and history of grade repetition and (ii) baseline beliefs contingent on each
higher education alternative i.e. technical/professional degrees, general degrees, vo-
cational diplomas/certificate courses and the fourth alternative of not attending fur-
ther education after 12th grade. While the three post-secondary education tracks were
constructed to maintain consistency with education data collected by the country’s
National Sample Survey (NSS), the categories are broad and encompass a variety of
courses of study. Therefore, data collection was preceded by a detailed explanation
with earnings beliefs remain invariant and also limits the time that students in the control group
have to acquire information from other sources, over time. The drawback is that I cannot comment
on the process of expectations formation over the long term or on the persistence of the effects
of information provision. However, Wiswall and Zafar (2015a), who collect revised beliefs both
instantaneously and over the long term, find the effects of information provision to be strongly
persistent two years after the provision of information.
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of possible courses/degrees that are part of every category. Since a majority of the
beliefs questions were either probabilistic in nature or required students to express
responses on a scale of 0-100, the baseline beliefs module was also preceded by a
discussion (with examples) on answering probabilistic questions6.
In the baseline beliefs module, stated probabilities of enrollment were elicited for (i)
all four higher-education alternatives7 and (ii) only for higher education alternatives
that comprise an individual’s affordable choice-set. Next, individuals were asked
about certain non-pecuniary and pecuniary beliefs conditional on each education al-
ternative. Pecuniary beliefs included data on expected probability of employment
and expected average monthly earnings. These pecuniary beliefs were collected both
for individuals perceptions regarding their own expected labor market outcomes and
outcomes they believe apply to an average individual in the population8. Non-
pecuniary beliefs included questions regarding enjoyment of coursework, parental
6We ensured that answers to all probabilistic questions sum to 100 by placing the total as
a constraint in the questionnaire, without fulfilling which, the survey would not proceed to the
subsequent question.
7The exact wording of the question used to elicit enrollment probabilities for potentially hypo-
thetically choice sets of individuals was: “Think ahead to next year when you have completed (sic)
intermediate. Imagine that you have passed your (sic) intermediate examinations and are able to
secure admission in one degree/course belonging to each of the options 1, 2 and 3. Option 4 is
also available to you. Suppose that you are provided with financial aid such that all your expenses
(tuition, boarding, room, etc.) are paid for at a private/government institute for a course belonging
to each options 1, 2 and 3. State the percent chance that you would enroll in each of the following?”
This statement was followed by the four education options among which students had to allocate
probabilities.
8For e.g. the question used to elicit own earnings beliefs was: Consider the situation where you
graduate from a degree belonging to the alternative insert track. Look ahead to when you will be
30 years old. Think about the types of jobs associated with degree/course. How much do you think
YOU would earn per MONTH on AVERAGE, if you completed a degree of this type? “You” was
replaced with the phrasing “Typical person” to elicit beliefs about earnings of an average person
in the population.
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approval of education track and likelihood of graduation. In this paper, we are in-
terested in disentangling the effect of information-gaps in one particular aspect of
individuals’ information sets- their knowledge about the distribution of population
(public) earnings by post-secondary track. Therefore, the only belief our experiment
manipulates (and which we collect post-treatment data on) are individuals’ beliefs
regarding track-specific expected average monthly earnings. We utilize beliefs about
expected average monthly earnings in this paper, and the other aforementioned be-
lief variables are not analyzed in detail here. Secondly, since the focus of this paper
is on recovering the elasticity of enrollment intentions to earnings beliefs, we utilize
data on all four higher education alternatives hypothetically “available” to an indi-
vidual. Restricting estimation to only affordable alternatives biases our parameter
of interest, as individuals constrained by costs might appear falsely unresponsive to
the information intervention.
Another part of the data-collection focused on measuring the demand for higher-
education loans in our sample. Therefore, additionally, at the end of round 1, all
students were given a loan-card which had two questions related to borrowing for
higher education which they had to think about at home and discuss with their
family members. The two questions were- a) whether the individual would like to
accept a loan, offered at a fair interest rate, for attending higher education, to be
repaid only after completion of their studies- yes or no b) If yes, keeping in mind
the length of their desired degree, how much would they like to borrow on a yearly
basis?
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The 20 minute information session discussed the average and the 25th and 75th per-
centile of the monthly earnings distribution of men and women who have completed
each higher education alternative. This data was calculated from two latest rounds of
National Sample Survey (NSS) data9. Individuals part of the information treatment
group also took home a sheet of paper with a graph and some statistics that sum-
marized the contents of the information session that they were part of. The script of
the information-session is reproduced in section 1.A and the information sheet taken
home by the students is given in Figure 1.A.2. The loan card taken home by the
students is given in Figure 1.A.3, along with the accompanying loan script.
The next day, for round 2, students were (i) re-asked about their stated enrollment
probabilities for all four higher education alternatives, (ii) expected average monthly
earnings for each higher education alternative. In addition, their response to the
questions posed in the loan card were also recorded.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Covariate Balance
Table 1.B.1 in section 1.B summarizes the key background variables of sample indi-
viduals and checks for balance in these characteristics across control and treatment
9Refers to two latest rounds of employment-unemployment data; i.e. - NSS 66th round (2009-10)
and NSS 68th round (2011-12)
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groups, for the full sample. Control and treatment individuals do not differ statis-
tically on account of almost all relevant socio-economic and demographic character-
istics, at baseline. However, we see that control individuals are more likely to own
land (p-value=0.04) and individuals in the treatment group have a slightly higher in-
dex of household assets (p-value=0.10). Nevertheless, one other variable that is also
indicative of the individuals households well-being, namely the HH Facility Index,
does not statistically differ between control and treatment groups. More importantly,
baseline differences in land ownership and household assets, do not manifest in sta-
tistically different baseline enrollment probabilities. Figure 1.4-Figure 1.7 also show
that there are no pre-existing differences between the two groups in the distributions
of track-specific own-wage beliefs.
Table 1.B.2 breaks down the sample by current stream of study. Here, the Arts and
the Science streams seem to be balanced on baseline variables, but there are some
imbalances in the commerce stream (5 out of 20 variables). However, some of the
variables go in opposite directions. For instance, treatment group individuals have
a higher asset index but are less likely to own land. Therefore, in Table 1.B.3, I
complement Table 1.B.1 & Table 1.B.2 by using the F-test approach to testing for
balance. Here, for the commerce stream, the p-value for the F-test that all coefficients
are zero is around 0.30.
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1.5.2 Correlates of Current Stream of Study
Sub-group heterogeneity in this paper is examined by students’ current stream of
study, a dimension along which the survey sample was stratified. Typically, higher-
secondary education in India (grades 11th and 12th) entails students to be enrolled
in one of three streams of study- (1) Arts (humanities), (2) Commerce or (3) Sci-
ence.10 Students’ current stream of study is strongly correlated with their future
post-secondary education choices, in part because it often determines eligibility for
future study. That is, which particular degrees/courses a student could potentially
study within the three attendance tracks discussed in this paper, is to a large ex-
tent determined by their stream of study at the higher-secondary level. Accordingly,
students’ preferences for post-secondary study and eventual occupations are taken
into account by them when they choose their stream of study in 11th grade. Hence,
a-priori, the impact of track-specific information is expected to differ according to
students’ current educational stream. Students belonging to a particular stream take
classes together and hence can also be expected to have correlated information sets
at baseline and to further develop common proclivities towards type of future study.
Current stream of study is correlated with expected post-secondary enrollment. This
can be seen in the last four rows of Table 1.B.4. Students in the Science stream are
nearly 18 percentage points (pp.) more likely to want to enroll in technical tracks
10The arts stream includes subjects like history, political science, psychology, sociology, languages;
the commerce stream includes the study of accounts, business, business mathematics and the science
stream includes subjects such as physics, chemistry, computer science and mathematics. Economics
can typically be studies across the three streams.
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as compared to Arts students and 12 pp. more likely as compared to Commerce
students. Arts and Commerce students are more likely than Science students to
enroll in general tracks. Arts students state the highest non-attendance probabilities,
followed by Commerce and then Science students.
For the sample under study the selection of stream in 11th grade was not purely
based on preferences but followed a cut-off system where students apply to study
in a given stream, and admission is based on points scored in the 10th grade board
examination. The highest cut-offs were for Science, followed by Commerce and then
Arts. Table 1.B.4 confirms that students in the Science stream scored, on average,
nearly 11 pp. more than students in the Arts stream and roughly 6 pp. more than
students in the Commerce stream, in the 10th grade. The Science group also has
more males- almost 22 pp. more males than Arts and 16.5 pp. more males than
Commerce. Other correlates are as expected. Students in the Science stream have
the highest Asset/Household facility indices, are least likely to be lower caste (i.e.
Scheduled Tribe), most likely to belong to the majority religion (Hinduism), and have
the most educated parents and older siblings. These measures are least favorable to
students in the Arts stream and Commerce students are in the middle.
23
1.5.3 Baseline Relationship Between Expected Earnings &
Enrollment Intentions
The experiment in this paper follows from the premise that college enrollment de-
cisions are based on perceived net benefits from college (Manski (1993)) and that
subjective expectations of future earnings are important determinants of current ed-
ucation decisions (Arcidiacono, Hotz and Kang (2012);Wiswall and Zafar (2015a)).
In Table 1.B.5 I provide prima facie evidence on the relationship between expected
earnings and enrollment intentions, at baseline, in my sample. Here, I regress the
probability of enrollment of individual i for track j, on individual and track-specific
non-pecuniary and pecuniary beliefs. I control for individual (student) fixed effects
and exploit only within-individual variation in beliefs and enrollment intentions, to
estimate the importance of earnings as a determinant of intended enrollment. Nev-
ertheless, these estimates are only suggestive and not causal because unobserved
track-specific beliefs that are correlated with earnings beliefs, and predict intented
enrollment, are not accounted for.
Consistent with previous literature (Delavande and Zafar (2014); Zafar (2013)) these
estimates imply that expected earnings are small but statistically significant deter-
minants of enrollment intentions and that non-pecuniary factors are generally more
important in the decision-making process of students. The regression function un-
derlying these results is linear-log in wages, therefore a 1% increase in wage beliefs
regarding track j imply an increase of 0.023% increase in probability of enrolling in
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track j (col. 1 of Table 1.B.5). Beliefs regarding expected enjoyment of coursework is
the most important correlate of enrollment intentions (also the case in Zafar (2013)),
with a 1% increase in the probability of enjoying coursework being associated with
a 0.45% increase in the probability of enrolling in track j11.
Additionally, it is relevant to note that the coefficient on “log own wage” is more
than an order of magnitude smaller for Arts students as compared to the other two
groups and statistically insignificant (col. 2 and 6 of Table 1.B.5). To the extent
that it is costlier for individuals to process or pay attention to information not
relevant to their decision-making process (Hanna, Mullainathan and Schwartzstein
(2014);Sims (2003)), we might expect these students to not update their own-earnings
beliefs in response to information provision. If the baseline elasticity of enrollment to
earnings is strongly correlated with the experimental elasticity, we might expect these
students to not update enrollment intentions/borrowing decisions despite updating
own earnings beliefs.
1.5.4 Baseline Beliefs Regarding Population Earnings
Figure 1.1 plots the distribution of logged wage beliefs held by males and females in
the sample, for an average person in the population. In Indian Rupee (U.S. Dollar)
11If I estimate this relationship using a log-odds specification, comparable to the reduced form
model of Wiswall and Zafar (2015a) estimated with cross-sectional data, then my estimates imply
that a 1% increase in beliefs about own-earnings in a track (relative to own-earnings for non-
attendance) increase the log-odds of enrolling in that track by 0.2%. This estimate is much smaller
than their estimated elasticity of 1.6%.
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terms, the “true” (measured from nationally representative data) average monthly
earnings for working age individuals having completed a technical education track is
Rs. 22,071 (328 USD) per month for males and Rs. 16,453 (245 USD) per month for
females. Average monthly earnings for having completed a general education track
is Rs. 15,280 (227 USD) per month for males and Rs. 12,750 (190 USD) per month
for females and average monthly for having completed a vocational education track
is Rs. 14,495 (216 USD) per month for males and Rs. 12,210 (182 USD) per month
for females. Average monthly earnings of those who don’t pursue post-secondary is
Rs. 9,973 (148 USD) per month for males and Rs. 8,907 (132 USD) per month for
females. Thus, measured college premiums for completing post-secondary education
are high and range from around 121 (85) percent for technical tracks to 45 (37)
percent for vocational tracks, for males (females).
Figure 1.1 indicates that a majority of males seem to substantially over-estimate pop-
ulation wages for the three attendance tracks and for the non-attendance alternative.
A majority of females also seem to over-estimate population wages12. However, for
the three attendance tracks, the proportion of over-estimators is smaller for females
as compared to males and for the non-attendance alternative the proportion of over-
estimators is smaller as compared to the attendance tracks. In investigating the role
of information gaps with regards to college attendance, we are interested in the er-
rors that individuals make for the attendance tracks, relative to the non-attendance
12Interestingly, Bonilla, Bottan and Ham (2016) and Gamboa and Rodr´ıguez Lesmes (2014) also
find that their respective samples of high school students substantially overestimate the wages of
college graduates in Colombia. Therefore, even within low-income populations, among the demo-
graphic of high school students, underestimation of college earnings does not seem to be a serious
impediment to individuals under-investing in college-level education.
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alternative. In this regard, males can be said to have more accurate beliefs at base-
line as compared to females. Table 1.1 tabulates the percentage of students who
over-estimate earnings in all four tracks. The “Full Sample” panel of Table 1.1 in-
dicates that 70% of males overestimate population earnings for the non-attendance
alternative. This proportion is higher by 2, 4 and 13 percentage points for technical,
general and vocational tracks, respectively. In contrast, 49% of females overestimate
population earnings for the non-attendance alternative. For girls, this proportion
is higher by 21, 13 and 17 percentage points for technical, general and vocational
tracks, respectively.
Figure 1.2 plots the distribution of logged wage beliefs, for an average person in the
population, broken down by students’ current stream of study. Three facts are ap-
parent in these figures. One, for all tracks, the extent of over-estimation is higher for
students in the Commerce and Science streams, as compared to students in the Arts
(Humanities) stream; two, the distributions of population-beliefs for Commerce and
Science students closely overlay each other; three at least for students in the Com-
merce & Science streams, the extent of over-estimation is higher for the three atten-
dance tracks as compared to the non-attendance alternative. Stream-specific panels
in Table 1.1 further illustrate these points. While for students in the Arts stream
there is no dominant direction in which baseline errors prevail (especially when at-
tendance tracks are compared to the non-attendance alternative), for Commerce and
Science students a majority of students (1) overestimate earnings for all tracks and
(2) overestimate attendance earnings to a larger extent than non-attendance earn-
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ings. In addition, for both of these streams, a much larger proportion of females,
as compared to males, over-estimate attendance earnings relative to the proportion
that over-estimates non-attendance earnings.
Figure 1.3 gives an idea of the relative magnitude of overestimation versus under-
estimation in the sample. It is a scatter plot of the percentile mean of baseline
population errors where “error” is defined as (perceived population wages)ij-(true
population wages)ij for individual i and track j, and measured in true-wage units.
Looking at errors on either side of the zero-error line, and with added focus on errors
within 1 true-wage unit of zero-error, we see that for the three attendance tracks
there are substantially more individuals one-unit above the true wage than there
are below, though, within this range, individuals are more evenly distributed for the
non-attendance track.
1.5.5 Impact on Own-Wage Beliefs
The impact of the treatment on own-wage beliefs is measured first for each track sep-
arately (Equation 1.2) and then for each attendance track relative to non-attendance
(Equation 1.3):
log(Wijt) = α + β1Post+ β2T + β3(Post× T ) + θXit=1 + uijt (1.2)
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log(Wijt)− log(WiJt) = α + β1Post+ β2T + β3(Post× T ) + θXit=1 + uijt (1.3)
Where log(Wijt) is the log of own-wage belief of individual i, conditional on enroll-
ment in track j, at either t = 1 (pre-treatment) or t = 2 (post-treatment). Post is
a dummy variable which equals 1 for post-treatment data, T is a dummy variable
which equals 1 for individuals in the treatment group. β3, our coefficient of interest,
measures the average effect of the treatment on updating of own-wage beliefs. Xit=1
denotes baseline controls and uijt is a mean zero error term. log(WiJt) is the log of
own-wage beliefs of individual i for the non-attendance track.
The latter specification is important because we analyze enrollment decisions in a
log-odds framework and interpret attendance log-odds relative to a base-case of non-
attendance.
1.5.5.1 Full Sample
Figure 1.4-Figure 1.7 plot pre and post treatment distributions of own-wage beliefs
for control and treatment groups, by track. To focus on the bulk of the distribution
and to avoid stretching out the densities to the extremes, I plot densities in the
1-99 percentile range of the data. The presented Kolmogorov-Smirnov p-values for
equality of distributions are however based on the full data. For all four tracks,
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there are no baseline differences in the respective distributions. Post-treatment, the
distribution for the three attendance tracks shifts leftward (a downward revision)
and this shift is statistically significant. The shift is perceptibly larger for general
and vocational tracks. There is no statistically discernible shift in the distribution
of non-attendance earnings.
Table 1.2 examines the effect of the information treatment on updating of own-
wage beliefs in a regression. Panel A looks at each track separately and Panel B
presents updating for each of the three attendance tracks relative to updating for
the non-attendance alternative. For all four tracks, the treatment is associated with
a downward revision in own-wage beliefs, but the revision is statistically significant
for only one track (vocational). Relative to non-attendance, the overall effect of the
treatment on updating of attendance-track wage beliefs for all three tracks is not
statistically significant. The effect-sizes imply an upward revision of earnings-beliefs
of around 6% (technical track) and downward revisions ranging from around 3 to 7.3
percent (general and vocational tracks).
1.5.5.2 By Baseline Error
Table 1.3 examines the effect of the treatment on own wage-belief updating, sepa-
rately for those who under and over estimate track-specific population wage beliefs at
baseline13. Panels A and C look at updating for all four tracks separately, for under
13Baseline under estimators are those for whom (perceived population wages)ij-(true population
wages)ij < 0. Over-estimators are conversely defined.
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and over-estimators, respectively. Panels B and D present updating relative to the
non-attendance track. In this case baseline under (over) estimators are also defined
as those who under (over) estimate attendance-track population earnings relative to
non-attendance14.
Focusing on Panels A and C, in general, under-estimators seem to revise wage be-
liefs upwards and over-estimators seem to revise wage beliefs downwards (3 out of
4 tracks in each case). Wage beliefs revisions for baseline under-estimators are rel-
atively smaller and statistically indistinguishable from zero as compared to wage
belief revisions for over-estimators. This can partly be explained by differences in
the extent of baseline errors between the two-groups, shown in Figure 1.3. Overall,
there are fewer under-estimators than over-estimators (20-30% of the full sample, de-
pending on track), and over-estimators are farther away from the zero error line than
are under-estimators. This is true, even if we restrict our attention to 1 true-wage
unit below and above zero. Among over-estimators, individuals revise wage-beliefs
downwards for all four tracks, with the magnitudes being largest (and statistically
significant) for the general and vocational tracks. However, the magnitude of down-
ward revision for the non-attendance track is also quite large. As can be seen in
Panel D it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that wage-revisions, relative to
non-attendance, on account of the treatment are zero. The same holds for baseline
under-estimators in Panel B.
14Therefore, for this specification, baseline under estimators are those for whom
{[(perceived population wages)ij-(true population wages)ij]-[(perceived population wages)iJ-(true
population wages)iJ]} < 0
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1.5.5.3 By Current Stream of Study
Table 1.4 examines the effect of the treatment on own wage-belief updating, by
students’ current stream of study, an important determinant of post-secondary ed-
ucation decisions. For each of the three streams- Arts/Humanities, Commerce and
Science I first examine updating for all four tracks (Panels A, C, and E) and then
updating for the three attendance tracks relative to non-attendance (Panels B, D,
and F). For students in the Arts stream, the impact of the information treatment on
own wage revisions is statistically insignificant. Individuals revise own-wage beliefs
downwards by similar magnitudes for general, vocational and non-attendance tracks,
implying small (1.5-2.2 percent) downward revisions for general and vocational tracks
relative to non-attendance.
In contrast, wage belief updating for attendance tracks relative to the non-attendance
alternative (Panels D & F), are large and statistically significant for Commerce and
Science students, but run in opposite directions. Students in the Commerce stream,
strongly revise own-wage beliefs downward for all three attendance tracks, relative
to the non-attendance alternative (Panel D). Here, the magnitudes of wage belief
updating indicate downward revisions of the magnitude 20-30 percent in treatment
relative to control groups15. This is driven by large downward revisions for the
attendance tracks (specifically general and vocational tracks) and no statistically
discernible (but upward) updating for the non-attendance track (Panel C).
15I use the formula prescribed in Kennedy et al. (1981) to interpret interaction terms as the
estimating equation is of log-linear form and the independent variables for interest are dummy
variables.
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For the third group of students, students in the Science stream, the treatment induces
them to revise relative attendance earnings upward for all three tracks (the effect is
statistically significant for technical and general tracks). This is driven entirely by a
strong downward revision in wage-beliefs for the non-attendance alternative and no
systematic updating for the three attendance tracks looked at separately (Panel E).
I also find that the pattern of relative wage belief updating established in Table 1.4
is largely driven by females in the sample. A part of the explanation for this could be
that females, as compared to males, perceive the returns to attendance, relative to
non-attendance, more inaccurately. This is shown in Table 1.5. Downward revision
is much stronger for females in the Commerce stream (the differential ranges from
24 to 33 percent) and the upward revision in the Science stream is driven entirely by
females (Panel C). Females in the Science stream revise own-wage beliefs upwards
by magnitudes of 43-66 percent in treatment relative to control groups. Table 1.6
confirms that this pattern holds even if we restrict the sample for these two streams
to only baseline over-estimators. Therefore, differential updating between Commerce
& Science groups exists holding fixed the direction of baseline error.
Differential updating by Commerce and Science students is further apparent in Ta-
ble 1.7 where we pool the three attendance tracks and examine own-wage revision
as a function of the magnitude of baseline error16. A statistically significant “treat-
16The regression specification here is:
(Wijt=2 −Wijt=1)T = α+ β1errorT + β2T + β3(errorT × T ) + θXit=1 + uijt (1.4)
Here, the dependent variable, WTijt which measures own-wage revision and “error
T ” which mea-
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ment x error” coefficient implies that own-wage revisions are a systematic function
of baseline error. A negative coefficient on the interaction term implies that larger
amounts of baseline under-estimation are associated with larger upward revisions in
treatment relative to control group. Focusing on columns (4)-(6), which include the
full set the baseline controls, we see that Commerce students systematically respond
to information presented for the attendance-tracks and Science students respond to
information presented for the non-attendance alternative.
Track by stream regressions in which wage-revisions cannot be systematically estab-
lished as a consequence of the treatment indicate that the track-specific information
provided was not relevant to the individuals of a given stream. In section 1.6, I
discuss that differences in updating between Commerce and Science students is not
a mechanical consequence of sub-group differences in baseline errors. I also provide
some evidence that non-updating is consistent with the Bayesian model but cannot
rule out the extent to which non-Bayesian updating constitute these findings.
1.5.6 Impact on Enrollment Intentions
Next, I examine whether updating of own-wage beliefs in response to information
on public earnings leads to updating of track-specific enrollment intentions among
the sample of students. I examine the impact of the treatment on enrollment in a
sures the difference between perceived and true population wage beliefs, can both take on negative
or positive values. Therefore, both variables are transformed using an inverse hyperbolic since
transformation, which behaves and is interpreted like a log-transformation, but allows keeping zero
and negative values Bellemare, Barrett and Just (2013).
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multinomial logit framework, elaborated in Equation 1.5.
ηijt = log(
piijt
piiJt
) = α + β1Post+ β2T + β3Track + β4(Post× T )
+β5(T × Track) + β6(Post× Track) + β6(Post× T × Track) + θXit=1 + uijt
(1.5)
Here, log(piijt) is the stated probability at round t of individual i enrolling in track
j and log(piiJt) is the stated probability of non-attendance. ηijt denotes the odds
of choosing in track j as opposed to non-attendance. β4 and β6 are coefficients
of interest, where β4 measures the average effect of the treatment on the log-odds
that an individual chooses the technical track as opposed to non-attendance and β6
measures the differential log-odds (relative to the base track technical) of choosing
general and vocational tracks.
Based on the log-odds regression in (1.5), the probability of enrolling in each track
j is given by:
Πijt =
exp{ηijt}∑J
j=1 exp{ηijt}
(1.6)
I use Equation 2.6 to compute the predicted probability of enrollment in each track
for control and treatment groups in rounds 1 and 2. The marginal effect of the
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treatment on the predicted probability of enrollment in each track is given by the
difference {Πˆjt=2 − Πˆjt=1}T − {Πˆjt=2 − Πˆjt=1}C . Where the subscripts T and C are
for treatment and control groups, respectively. Πˆjt denotes the predicted probability
of enrollment in track j, calculated using parameter estimates from (1.5).
This allows me to track how students allocate probability of enrollment across tracks
at baseline and post-treatment.
1.5.6.1 Full Sample
Table 1.8 (Panel A) presents the effect of the treatment on the log-odds of pursuing
each of the three attendance tracks relative to the base-case of non-attendance. How-
ever, we are interested not only in the relative likelihood of enrolling in each track
relative to non-enrollment, but in the absolute probability of choosing each track
which depends on how the three separate relative effects balance out each other.
Therefore, in Table 1.8 (Panel B), I present the marginal effect of the treatment on
the absolute probability of choosing each track. Together, both tables establish that
the overall effect of the treatment on enrollment is small and statistically insignif-
icant. This is consistent with the small effect of the treatment on the updating of
wage beliefs for the full sample. This result does not importantly change when the
sample is broken down by gender or by baseline error.17
17These result are omitted for brevity but available upon request
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1.5.6.2 By Current Stream of Study
In Table 1.9 (Panel A), I examine the effect of the treatment on the log-odds of pur-
suing each of the three attendance tracks relative to the base-case of non-attendance,
by current stream of study. In Table 1.10, I present these log-odds separately for
males and females.
For students in Arts/Humanities, the effect of the treatment on enrollment log-odds
is small, and statistically insignificant and the marginal effect of the treatment on the
predicted probability of enrollment is also small Table 1.9 (Panel B). As can be seen
in Table 1.10, for both males and females in this stream, we cannot reject the null that
the effect of the treatment on enrollment log-odds, relative to non-enrollment, for
each track is zero. This is consistent with the impact of the treatment on own-wage
belief updating for these students.
For students belonging to the Commerce stream, there is a decrease in enrollment log-
odds relative to non-attendance for technical and general streams (Table 1.9 (Panel
A)), and this effect is entirely driven by females (compare panel B to A of Table 1.10),
for whom there is a decrease in enrollment log-odds for all three attendance tracks
relative to non-attendance. This is consistent with the fact that for this group of
students, the overall effect of the treatment was a downward revision in own-wage
beliefs for each of the three attendance tracks, relative to non-attendance. As can
be seen in Table Table 1.9 (Panel B), which takes into account the relative size of
track-specific treatment effects from Table 1.9 (Panel A), for Commerce students,
37
there is a decrease the probability of enrollment in technical tracks by around 4.7
pp. and increase probability of enrollment in general tracks (1.45 pp.), vocational
tracks (2.77 pp.) and for non-attendance (0.477 pp.).
For students belonging to the Science stream, there is an increase in enrollment
log-odds relative to non-enrollment for all three attendance tracks Table 1.9 (Panel
A). A comparison of panel B to panel A in Table 1.10 shows that this effect of the
treatment on enrollment log-odds is driven by females. This too is consistent with
the fact that for this group of students, the overall effect of the treatment was an
upward revision in own-wage beliefs for each of the three attendance tracks, relative
to non-attendance. As can be seen in Table 1.9 (Panel B), for Science students there
is an increase the probability of enrollment in technical tracks by around 3.45 pp.
and decrease probability of enrollment in general tracks (0.505 pp.), vocational tracks
(2.28 pp.) and for non-attendance (0.668 pp.).
For both Science and Commerce students, and specifically for females, the direc-
tion of updating of enrollment intentions for each attendance track relative to non-
attendance, is broadly consistent with the direction of updating of wage beliefs for
each attendance track relative to non-attendance. However, the overall effect of
the treatment for Commerce students is to induce a movement away from technical
tracks and towards other tracks (more so vocational tracks) and on the contrary the
effect of the treatment for Science students is to induce a movement towards techni-
cal tracks and away from other tracks (more so vocational tracks). This fact cannot
be explained by the difference in magnitude of wage-belief revision between atten-
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dance tracks, which do not statistically differ from each other, within the groups of
Commerce and Science students18.
1.5.7 Impact on Borrowing
Recall that borrowing intentions for higher education were measured only post-
treatment. Also, unlike stated enrollment intentions, the intent to borrow was not
elicited as a track-specific decision. The average impact of the information treatment
on borrowing intentions is given by β1 in Equation 1.7 below:
Yit=2 = α + β1T + θXit=1 + uit (1.7)
Where Y is a binary variable measuring whether or not the individual would like to
accept a loan offer towards higher education enrollment. We may be concerned that
the answer to this survey question might not be reflective of what would happen if
a loan were actually made available, because individuals might not fully internalize
the costs of borrowing while answering this question. While it is not possible to
fully allay such concerns in this setting, it should be noted that the control group
mean of the fraction of individuals wanting to borrow is only around 56 percent.
This is despite the fact that on average only 1.04 tracks (out of 3) are thought to
18I refer here to panels D & F of Table 1.4. In a variant of these regressions, when tracks are
included as an interaction term, I confirm that the magnitude of wage-belief updating for each
attendance track does not statistically differ from the magnitude of updating for the other two
tracks.
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be affordable by individuals. The number of tracks affordable to individuals who do
not want to borrow is 1 and this number is 1.08 tracks for individuals who do want
to borrow.
Table 1.11 presents results on the impact of the information treatment on borrowing
intentions, which was the only other primary outcome that we measured in our
survey. Overall, treated individuals state a higher probability of intent to borrow,
which is higher by 6.7 pp. By stream, this effect is largest and statistically significant
only for students in the Science stream who have roughly a 15 pp. higher probability
of wanting to borrow when compared with students in the control group. This
represents a 25 percent increase in demand for borrowing, relative to the control
group mean. This result is further consistent with an upward revision for this group of
students in wage beliefs for attendance tracks relative to non-attendance. Conditional
on loan acceptance, the amount of that individuals would like to borrow does not
statistically differ on account of the treatment.
1.6 Can Heterogeneity in Updating be Explained?
In this section I discuss that while the wage belief updating of Arts students vis-a-vis
the other two streams can be attributable to two observed patterns in the data, the
differential updating between Science & Commerce students remains unexplained.
This points to the existence of substantial heterogeneity in updating heuristics in
the sample.
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In section 1.5.3, and with reference to Table 1.B.5, we already established that ex-
ante, we might expect Arts students to be less responsive to the information treat-
ment and that is indeed what we find. This ex-ante prediction is based on the
finding that for these students, at baseline, the enrollment elasticity of earnings be-
liefs is close to zero and statistically insignificant. Therefore, to the extent that it is
costlier for individuals to process or pay attention to information not relevant to their
decision-making process, we might expect these students to not update their own-
earnings beliefs in response to information provision. Across tracks, the updating of
own wage beliefs for Arts students, on account of the treatment, is statistically in-
significant and we cannot reject the null that it is zero (first two panels of Table 1.3).
The same analysis indicates that earnings beliefs seem to be important predictors
of enrollment intentions for both Commerce & Science students, and the coefficient
on log wages for both streams is of roughly equal magnitude. Experimentally, these
students update relative own-earnings and also enrollment and borrowing intentions,
in a manner consistent with the updating of own-wage beliefs. Therefore differences
in the baseline relevance of earnings provide us with one explanation for why we may
see differential updating for Arts as compared to Commerce & Science students. It
cannot explain why the two sets of students, Commerce & Science, respond to differ-
ent pieces of information and hence update relative earnings in opposite directions.
Therefore, next I examine whether differential updating can be rationalized on ac-
count of differences in baseline errors, regarding population earnings, between sub-
groups.
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In Figure 1.2 we had established that the distributions of population wage beliefs for
Commerce and Science students closely overlay each other. On the other hand, on
average, Arts students seem to make smaller errors for all four tracks. This is further
evident in Table 1.C.6. Here, we look at differences in baseline errors19 between the
three sub-groups in a regression framework, using OLS (col. 1) and quantile regres-
sions (col. 2-6). Focusing our attention on col.1, it is evident that for all tracks, for
students in the Arts stream, mean error is statistically significantly smaller (closer
to zero error) than for students in the Science stream. However, the mean error
for Commerce students does not statistically differ from that of Science students,
for any track. Quantile regression results (col. 2-6) also consistently point to the
fact that for several points along the distribution of baseline errors, Arts students
differ consistently in their perceptions about population earnings when compared
to Science students, while Commerce students do not. Therefore, while we cannot
rule out the possibility that Arts students update own-earnings differently than stu-
dents from the other two streams on an additional account of initial differences in
perceptions regarding population earnings, this cannot explain differential updating
between Commerce & Science streams. Therefore, it is evident that a substantial
amount of updating heterogeneity in the sample is, most likely, not a mechanical
consequence of differences in baseline errors regarding population earnings.
Next, I test whether the differential updating between Commerce & Science students
can be explained by a core prediction of the Bayesian model. That is, I test whether
individuals in the sample are more responsive to information regarding a track that
19Measured, as described in footnote 14, using an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation.
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they are less likely to enroll in (DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010); Oreopoulos and
Dunn (2013)), and hence have weaker priors about. In Table 1.C.7, I establish
that Commerce students have higher baseline likelihoods of non-attendance. This
is the case both when all four tracks are in an individual’s choice set, regardless of
affordability (unconstrained choice set), and when only affordable tracks enter an
individual’s choice set (constrained choice set)20. In the unconstrained case, Com-
merce students state 1.4-2 pp. higher likelihoods of non-attendance compared to
the reference category of Science students (who state about a 5.3% likelihood of non-
attendance). It is apparent that when the cost constraint is removed and all tracks are
hypothetically made available to all individuals, students state generally small prob-
abilities of non-attendance. With regards to data on individuals constrained choice
sets, wherein unaffordable options are assigned zero probability of attendance, Com-
merce students are about 6.6-9.2 pp. more likely to not-attend compared to Science
students whose probability of non-attendance is about 50%.
In Table 1.C.8 I test whether individuals with a higher baseline probability of en-
rolling in a track are less likely to update earnings beliefs in response to the infor-
mation treatment. I regress the absolute value of wage belief revision on levels and
an interaction of the treatment dummy with the baseline probability of enrollment.
While the effect of the treatment does not vary with the baseline probability of enroll-
ment for the unconstrained case, the “treatment x baseline enrollment probability”
interaction term is negative and significant (at the 5% level) when affordability of
tracks is taken into account. Therefore, the fact that Commerce students are less
20In this case tracks unaffordable to an individual are assigned a zero probability of attendance.
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likely to attend and more responsive to information on attendance tracks and Science
students are more likely to attendance and less responsive to information on atten-
dance tracks, is consistent with the core prediction of Bayesian updating bearing
out in the data. Previous work in the literature leads us to believe that a portion of
non-updating may also be non-Bayesian in nature (i.e. not explained by the variance
of priors), but unfortunately in the absence of further data, I cannot comment on
the extent to which that may be the case in this sample.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper I present results from an information experiment, which randomized
information on population earnings, for three post-secondary education tracks- tech-
nical, general, vocational and the final alternative of not pursuing post-secondary
education. The experiment was carried out with 1525 12th grade students, across
nine affiliated schools of a large, non-selective public state university in the Indian
state of Jharkhand.
The impact of information provision is measured by students updating of own wage
beliefs contingent on pursuing each post-secondary track, their stated probability of
enrollment across tracks and borrowing intentions for higher education enrollment.
Average impact of the treatment on the updating of own-wage beliefs and subsequent
changes in enrollment intentions is small, though the impact on borrowing intentions
is positive and statistically important. Average results mask considerable sub-group
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heterogeneity, defined by the current subject stream of students. For two out of
three sub-groups of students, the impact of the treatment on relative own-earnings
beliefs, is statistically important. For these two sub-groups, own-wage belief updat-
ing is stronger for females, a pattern which may partly be on account of the fact
that females perceive relative returns to attendance more inaccurately than males,
at baseline. However, I also find that females are more responsive to the informa-
tion treatment controlling for the size of baseline error (result omitted for brevity).
Interestingly, Wiswall and Zafar (2015b) also find this to be the case in their sample
of New York University (NYU) students. Within sub-group, the odds of enrollment,
relative to non-enrollment, is consistent with direction of wage belief updating and is,
reassuringly, stronger for the group (females) with larger wage belief updating. The
effect of the treatment on borrowing intentions is also in line it’s effect on wage-belief
updating.
For the two sub-groups (Commerce & Science) for whom the impact of the treatment
on wage beliefs for attendance tracks, relative to non-attendance, is statistically
important, the updating takes place in opposite directions. This pattern is on account
of the fact that individuals in the groups systematically respond to different pieces of
track-specific information. Students in the Commerce sub-group revise wage beliefs
downwards for attendance tracks only, and this pattern carries over to a downward
revision in earnings beliefs for attendance tracks, relative to non-attendance. Science
students revise wage beliefs downwards for the non-attendance track only, which
translates into attendance earnings being relatively more attractive for this group,
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post-treatment.
A combination of factors may explain why we see the first sub-group, students in
the Arts stream, not revise wage beliefs in response to the treatment. Ex-ante, these
students have a low elasticity of enrollment to wage beliefs and at baseline they
make smaller errors, on average, with regards to beliefs about population earnings.
However, these factors do not explain differential updating on the part of Science
& Commerce students. Ex-ante, these students have a statistically important and
similar in magnitude elasticity of enrollment to wage beliefs- therefore earnings likely
play an important role in their decisions for future education. These students also
make nearly identical errors with regards to population wage beliefs at baseline.
As discussed in the conceptual framework section of the paper, non-updating in
response to “new” information implies that the piece of information provided was
not relevant to individuals. Differential relevance of track-specific information to
different sub-groups of individuals in the sample drives the heterogeneous impacts of
information provision on own-wage belief updating. Sub-groups of individuals with
equally biased information sets vary in their response to information significantly,
depending on the extent to which their beliefs about population earnings are linked
to their beliefs about their own. Track-specific non-updating can be Bayesian or
“rational” or Non-Bayesian. Suggestive evidence implies that variation in updating
may be attributable to the variance of individuals’ priors (consistent with Bayesian
updating), but without further data on individual-level distributions of own-wage
beliefs, we cannot quantify the extent to which non-updating is Bayesian. However,
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recent evidence (Wiswall and Zafar (2015b)) establishes that individuals do indeed
deviate significantly from the Bayesian benchmark.
Recent papers in the literature which find information provision to have small aver-
age impacts on outcomes like test-scores or enrollment decisions state the presence of
other binding constraints like credit constraints or lack of knowledge of the education
production function as explanations. This paper offers another explanation for why
the provision of population-level information on returns may lead to highly hetero-
geneous outcomes, by examining in detail the first-link in the causal chain that links
population-level information to education outcomes, which is, the extent to which
individuals update own-earnings beliefs in response to receiving information about
population-level averages.
My study is a framed field experiment wherein participants deal with a subject of
interest outside the experiment (their own education) but not in an environment
where they would naturally undertake the task of thinking about their long term
plans. Stakes for the participants were also low with no costs to paying less atten-
tion to the information provided. Therefore, the study was not designed to provide
a model for scaling information provision at a national level, but to examine in more
detail mechanisms (updating of beliefs and intentions) critical to the success of in-
formation interventions. For a policy-maker looking to implement an information
campaign to induce more optimal education decision making, these findings imply,
all else constant, a limited potential for an information campaign to induce, on aver-
age, updating of beliefs regarding oneself, of a particular magnitude and in a given
47
direction, despite accurate knowledge of information gaps in a particular population.
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Figures & Tables for Chapter 1
Figure 1.1: Log Population Wage Beliefs by Gender
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Figure 1.2: Log Population Wage Beliefs by Current Stream of Study
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Figure 1.3: Scatter Plot of Baseline Population Errors Relative to True Wage
(Zero-Error Line)
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Figure 1.4: Pre and Post Distributions of Own Wage Beliefs for Technical
Track; Range 1-99 Percentile
Figure 1.5: Pre and Post Distributions of Own Wage Beliefs for General
Track; Range 1-99 Percentile
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Figure 1.6: Pre and Post Distributions of Own Wage Beliefs for Vocational
Track; Range 1-99 Percentile
Figure 1.7: Pre and Post Distributions of Own Wage Beliefs for Non-
Attendance Track; Range 1-99 Percentile
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Table 1.1: % of Students Who Overestimate Earnings at Baseline
Full Sample:
Overall Males Females
Technical 71.41% 72.24% 70.43%
General 64.13% 66.06% 61.86%
Vocational 75.34% 83.39% 65.86%
Not Attend 60.79% 70.55% 49.29%
Arts:
Overall Males Females
Technical 55.49% 53.22% 57.34%
General 49.52% 49.79% 49.30%
Vocational 61.08% 71.24% 52.80%
Not Attend 53.18% 63.09% 45.10%
Commerce:
Overall Males Females
Technical 77.19% 73.19% 81.20%
General 73.35% 74.47% 72.22%
Vocational 82.52% 87.23% 77.78%
Not Attend 62.47% 72.34% 52.56%
Science:
Overall Males Females
Technical 81.72% 84.03% 77.09%
General 70.34% 71.15% 68.72%
Vocational 82.84% 88.80% 70.95%
Not Attend 66.79% 74.23% 51.96%
58
Table 1.2: Impact of the Information Treatment on Own Wage Beliefs for
Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Own Wage Log Own Wage Log Own Wage Log Own Wage
Panel A: (Technical) (General) (Vocational) (Not Attend)
post x treatment -0.00742 -0.0969 -0.140** -0.0679
(0.0564) (0.0592) (0.0578) (0.0649)
Observations 2,961 2,961 2,961 2,955
Log Own Wage Log Own Wage Log Own Wage
Panel B: (Tech./NA) (Gen./NA) (Voc./NA)
post x treatment 0.0606 -0.0300 -0.0743 -
(0.0638) (0.0633) (0.0632) -
Observations 2,955 2,955 2,955 -
School FE YES YES YES YES
Stream FE YES YES YES YES
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the survey session level. Number of clusters: 106.
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All main effects are included.
Results are robust to addition of baseline controls.
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Table 1.3: Impact of the Information Treatment on Own Wage Beliefs by
Baseline Error
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Own Wage Log Own Wage Log Own Wage Log Own Wage
(Technical) (General) (Vocational) (Not Attend)
Under-estimators:
Panel A:
post x treatment 0.0803 -0.0238 0.0499 0.0535
(0.130) (0.114) (0.134) (0.0992)
Observations 847 1,058 730 1,148
Log Own Wage Log Own Wage Log Own Wage
(Tech./NA) (Gen./NA) (Voc./NA)
Panel B:
post x treatment 0.146 0.0801 -0.0505 -
(0.112) (0.102) (0.126) -
Observations 1,169 1,338 897 -
Over-estimators:
Log Own Wage Log Own Wage Log Own Wage Log Own Wage
(Technical) (General) (Vocational) (Not Attend)
Panel C:
post x treatment -0.0434 -0.131** -0.188*** -0.118
(0.0565) (0.0638) (0.0586) (0.0742)
Observations 2,114 1,903 2,231 1,807
Log Own Wage Log Own Wage Log Own Wage
(Tech./NA) (Gen./NA) (Voc./NA)
Panel D:
post x treatment 0.00196 -0.120 -0.0830 -
(0.0758) (0.0726) (0.0713) -
Observations 1,786 1,617 2,058 -
School FE YES YES YES YES
Stream FE YES YES YES YES
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the survey session level. Number of clusters:
102 (under)- 106 (over). *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All main effects are included.
Results are robust to addition of baseline controls.
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Table 1.4: Impact of the Information Treatment on Own Wage Beliefs by
Stream
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Own Wage Log Own Wage Log Own Wage Log Own Wage
(Technical) (General) (Vocational) (Not Attend)
Arts:
Panel A:
post x treatment 0.0756 -0.140 -0.147 -0.124
(0.130) (0.122) (0.136) (0.116)
Observations 1,010 1,010 1,010 1,010
Log Own Wage Log Own Wage Log Own Wage
(Tech./NA) (Gen./NA) (Voc./NA)
Panel B:
post x treatment 0.200 -0.0159 -0.0223 -
(0.138) (0.125) (0.139) -
Observations 1,010 1,010 1,010 -
Commerce:
Log Own Wage Log Own Wage Log Own Wage Log Own Wage
(Technical) (General) (Vocational) (Not Attend)
Panel C:
post x treatment -0.0455 -0.182* -0.163** 0.169
(0.0805) (0.102) (0.0809) (0.102)
Observations 917 917 917 912
Log Own Wage Log Own Wage Log Own Wage
(Tech./NA) (Gen./NA) (Voc./NA)
Panel D:
post x treatment -0.215** -0.349*** -0.330*** -
(0.103) (0.119) (0.0904) -
Observations 912 912 912 -
Science:
Log Own Wage Log Own Wage Log Own Wage Log Own Wage
(Technical) (General) (Vocational) (Not Attend)
Panel E:
post x treatment -0.0534 0.0232 -0.108 -0.218**
(0.0725) (0.0831) (0.0730) (0.110)
Observations 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,033
Log Own Wage Log Own Wage Log Own Wage
(Tech./NA) (Gen./NA) (Voc./NA)
Panel F:
post x treatment 0.167* 0.238*** 0.102 -
(0.0984) (0.0835) (0.0903) -
Observations 1,033 1,033 1,033 -
School FE YES YES YES
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the survey session level. Number of clusters:
90-92 (range). *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All main effects are included.
Results are robust to addition of baseline controls
Table 1.5: Differential Impact of Information on Own Wage Beliefs for Fe-
males (By Current Stream of Study)
(1) (2) (3)
Log Own Wage Log Own Wage Log Own Wage
Dependent Variables: (Tech./NA) (Gen./NA) (Voc./NA)
Panel A; Arts/Humanities:
post x treatment 0.0505 -0.183 -0.205
(0.181) (0.137) (0.155)
post x treatment x female 0.274 0.315 0.332
(0.267) (0.252) (0.245)
Observations 1,010 1,010 1,010
Panel B; Commerce:
post x treatment -0.0922 -0.159 -0.208*
(0.125) (0.144) (0.116)
post x treatment x female -0.248 -0.376* -0.235
(0.205) (0.218) (0.187)
Observations 912 912 912
Panel C; Science:
post x treatment 0.0272 0.110 -0.0899
(0.105) (0.0778) (0.0861)
post x treatment x female 0.377** 0.369** 0.529***
(0.178) (0.166) (0.170)
Observations 1,033 1,033 1,033
School FE YES YES YES
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the survey session level. Number of clusters: 90.
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All main effects and two-way interactions included.
Results are robust to addition of baseline controls
62
Table 1.6: Differential Impact of Information on Own Wage Beliefs by Gen-
der (For Over-estimators in Commerce & Science)
(1) (2) (3)
Log Own Wage Log Own Wage Log Own Wage
Dependent variable: (Tech./NA) (Gen./NA) (Voc./NA)
Commerce-Males:
post x treatment -0.315** -0.325* -0.302***
(0.150) (0.169) (0.108)
Observations 270 272 348
Commerce-Females:
post x treatment -0.361** -0.655*** -0.455***
(0.148) (0.164) (0.134)
Observations 329 314 323
Science-Males:
post x treatment 0.0952 0.0105 -0.153*
(0.132) (0.0999) (0.0840)
Observations 493 409 575
Science-Females:
post x treatment 0.393* 0.363* 0.517**
(0.204) (0.208) (0.193)
Observations 235 203 235
School FE YES YES YES
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the survey session level. Number of clusters:
44-74 (range). *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All main effects are included.
Results are robust to addition of baseline controls.
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Table 1.7: Revision in Own-Wage Beliefs as a Continuous Function of Base-
line Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Arts Commerce Science Arts Commerce Science
Dependent variable: OwnWageTijt=2 −OwnWageTijt=1
Attendance Tracks:
treatment x error -0.00509 -0.0206* -0.00523 -0.00548 -0.0214** -0.00814
(0.00945) (0.0107) (0.0105) (0.00954) (0.00916) (0.00991)
Observations 1,473 1,344 1,494 1,473 1,344 1,494
Non Attendance Track:
treatment x error -0.00723 -0.00834 -0.0268*** -0.00600 -0.0160 -0.0289***
(0.0119) (0.0129) (0.00997) (0.0121) (0.0123) (0.00925)
Observations 491 448 498 491 448 498
School FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Add. Baseline Controls NO NO NO YES YES YES
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the survey session level. Number of clusters: 88-90 (range)
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All main effects are included.
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Table 1.8: Impact of the Information Treatment on Enrollment for Full Sam-
ple
(Panel A)
Dependent Variable: Enrollment Log-Odds
post x treatment 0.0612
(0.126)
post x treatment x general 0.0415
(0.112)
post x treatment x vocational 0.0425
(0.101)
Observations (3 tracks x round) 8,880
School FE YES
Stream FE YES
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the survey session level. Number of clusters: 106.
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All main effects and two-way interactions are included.
Results are robust to addition of baseline controls.
Panel B–Marginal Effects on the Predicted Probability of Enrollment
(Parameter estimates from Panel A)
Technical General Vocational Not Attend
-0.904% 0.856% 0.452% -0.404%
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Table 1.9: Impact of the Information Treatment on Enrollment (By Current
Stream of Study)
(Panel A)
Arts/Humanities Commerce Science
Dependent variable: Enrollment Enrollment Enrollment
Log Odds Log Odds Log Odds
post x treatment 0.102 -0.255 0.317**
(0.212) (0.210) (0.157)
post x treatment x general 0.0617 0.162 -0.0913
(0.191) (0.179) (0.163)
post x treatment x vocational 0.0416 0.283* -0.179
(0.184) (0.169) (0.144)
Observations 3,030 2,751 3,099
School FE YES YES YES
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the survey session level. Number of clusters: 90.
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All main effects and two-way interactions are included.
Results are robust to addition of baseline controls.
Panel B–Marginal Effects on the Predicted Probability of Enrollment
(Parameter estimates from Panel A)
Technical General Vocational Not Attend
Arts -1.232% 1.636% 0.451% -0.855%
Commerce -4.705% 1.456% 2.772% 0.477%
Science 3.456% -0.505% -2.283% -0.668%
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Table 1.10: Impact of the Information Treatment on Enrollment (By Current
Stream of Study; Effects by Gender)
Arts/Humanities Commerce Science
Dependent Variables: Enrollment Enrollment Enrollment
Log Odds Log Odds Log Odds
Panel A; Males:
post x treatment 0.292 0.0811 0.174
(0.287) (0.259) (0.193)
post x treatment x general 0.264 -0.100 -0.0386
(0.234) (0.191) (0.175)
post x treatment x vocational -0.0121 0.120 -0.203
(0.230) (0.213) (0.161)
Observations 1,374 1,377 2,070
Panel B; Females:
post x treatment -0.0566 -0.611* 0.589**
(0.301) (0.322) (0.283)
post x treatment x general -0.0857 0.404 -0.184
(0.281) (0.289) (0.310)
post x treatment x vocational 0.0823 0.454* -0.129
(0.264) (0.250) (0.270)
Observations 1,656 1,374 1,029
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the survey session level. Number of clusters: 49-77 (range).
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. All main effects and two-way interactions are included.
Results are robust to addition of baseline controls.
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Table 1.11: Impact of the Information Treatment on Borrowing Probability
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Arts Commerce Science
treatment 0.0665* -0.0360 0.0571 0.147***
(0.0353) (0.0573) (0.0555) (0.0399)
mean dep. control group 0.5612 0.5447 0.5267 0.6088
Observations 1,437 491 448 498
School FE YES YES YES YES
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the survey session level. Number of clusters:
88-106 (range). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Results are robust to addition of baseline controls.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
1.A Survey Details
Figure 1.A.1: Survey Structure & Experimental Design
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English Translation of Information Script
“ Your contribution to the first round of the survey is now over. However, before you
leave we would like to talk to you about a few more things. Now onwards, you do
not need to fill anything else on the tablet, only pay attention towards the screen.
You have with you the printout of the graph and table that you are seeing on the
screen (attached at the end of the script). You are encouraged to take this home
with you.
With the help of the information on the screen, we would like to provide you with
some findings from recent survey data collected by the Government of India. Every
few years, the Government surveys a sample of people from all Indian states and
asks them about what occupation they are currently engaged in and their weekly
earnings in that occupation. This survey allows us to see what the average earnings
are for different individuals without having to guess or just go by what we hear from
a few people. The information presented uses data on roughly 40,000 people. The
data was collected between 2009 & 2012.
Now, we would like to draw your attention to the graph on the screen. This graph
shows the average monthly earnings of four groups of people. The graph on the
left side is for men and the graph on the right side is for women. According to
the graph on the left, for men who have completed a technical degree, their average
monthly earnings are around 22,070 rupees. Similarly, if we talk about men who have
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completed a general degree, their average monthly earnings are 15,280 rupees. Those
who have obtained a diploma or completed certificate course, their average monthly
earnings are around 14,500 rupees and for men not studying after intermediate, their
average monthly earnings are around 9,970 rupees.
Similarly, for women who have completed a technical degree, their average monthly
earnings are around 16,450 rupees. If we talk about women who have completed a
general degree, their average monthly earnings are 12,750 rupees. Those women who
have completed a diploma or certificate course, their average monthly earnings are
around 12,200 rupees and for women not studying after intermediate, their average
monthly earnings are around 8,900 rupees.
It is important to keep in mind that average earnings do not imply that every in-
dividual in that group earns the average amount. Some people earn more than the
average and some people earn less. For this reason, for every higher education group,
we will now try to explain to you what the lower & higher amounts earned by people
in that group are.
Now we would like to draw your attention towards the table in the slide. If we look
at the data of men and women who have obtained a technical degree, we see that 25
percent of men earn approximately 11,780 rupees or less and 25 percent of women
earn approximately 6,200 rupees or less. In the category of men who earn a technical
degree, 95 percent of people, in a month, earn 51,400 rupees or less and 95 percent
of women who have earned a technical degree, earn approximately 42,800 rupees or
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less. This means that 51,400 rupees is the 95th percentile of men who have technical
degrees and 42,800 rupees is the 95th percentile of women who earn technical degrees.
This also means that very few men in this group earn more than 51,400 rupees per
month and very few women earn more than 42,800 rupees per month.
Before proceeding, ask all students if they understand the meaning of percentile and
if they have any questions. (Enumerators were encouraged to have a discus-
sion around the concept of a percentile.)
Lets talk more about the data of men and women who have obtained a general
degree. The 25th percentile for men in this group is 7,500 rupees and for women it
is 4,500 rupees. The 95th percentile for men in this group is 36,000 rupees and for
women it is around 32,120 rupees. As discussed before, this means that very few
men in the group earn more than 36,000 rupees per month and very few women in
this group earn more than 32,120 rupees per month.
Now, lets talk about the data of men and women who have obtain a vocational
degree. The 25th percentile for men in this group is around 6,430 rupees and for
women it is 4,500 rupees. The 95th percentile for men in this group is 36,000 rupees
and for women it is around 30,000 rupees. As discussed before, this means that very
few men in the group earn more than 36,000 rupees per month and very few women
in this group earn more than 30,000 rupees per month.
Finally, lets talk about the data of men and women who do not study beyond in-
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termediate. The 25th percentile for men in this group is around 4,290 rupees and
for women it is around 2,680 rupees. The 95th percentile for men in this group is
around 26,000 rupees and for women it is 24,990 rupees. As discussed before, this
means that very few men in the group earn more than 26,000 rupees per month and
very few women in this group earn more than 24,990 rupees per month. Again, the
information that we have discussed with you today, is also given in the printout that
is with you. Please look at it again at home. ”
(Information Sheet on Next Page. Students in the treatment group took
this sheet home and the same sheet was projected on screen during the
information discussion.)
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 तकनीकी डिग्री सामान्य डिग्री डिप्लोमा / सर्टिफिकेट 
कोसि 
दाखिला नह ीं 
 परुष मर्हला परुष मर्हला परुष मर्हला परुष मर्हला 
25 प्रततशतक1 
11,786 6,206 7,500 4,500 6,429 4,500 4,286 2,679 
95 प्रततशतक2 
51,429 42,857 36,000 32,117 36,000 30,000 26,001 24,990 
 
                                                          
1 इसका मतलब है की 25 प्रततशत पुरुष / मर्हला हर माह र्दए गये रकम या इससे कम कमात ेहैं| 
2 इसका मतलब है की 95 प्रततशत पुरुष / मर्हला हर माह र्दए गये रकम या इससे कम कमात ेहैं| 
Figure 1.A.2: Image of Information Sheet Accompanying Script
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English Translation of Loan Script
“We want to place in front of you, one other hypothetical situation, for you to think
at home about. Not all students are able to continue their studies after intermediate.
Often, their household income is not enough for them to continue their studies or for
them to enroll in a higher education program of their choice. In some such situations,
bank or non-bank institutions are able to offer higher education loans, at fair interest
rates, which you have to repay after completing your higher education.
Some of you must be wondering what is meant by the term interest rate. Suppose
you take a loan of 100 rupees on which there is a 10% interest rate. When repaying
this loan, you have to return 110 rupees. This additional 10 rupees that you pay is
your interest. Fair interest rate means a rate that is neither too low or neither too
high.
Please read out the questions on the loan card given to the students.
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Figure 1.A.3: Loan Card
We will ask you about your response to this question when we meet tomorrow.
In the meantime, please think about this at home and if possible discuss this with
your mother/father or other family members. We are very eager to learn what you
think about this, so please do not forget to attend tomorrows survey session in room
[room number] at [time].”
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1.B Balance of Baseline Variables & Correlates of Stream of
Study
Table 1.B.1: Balance of Baseline Variables
(1) (2) (3)
Control Treatment p-value
Age 17.24 17.30 0.19
% Male 0.53 0.55 0.45
% Scheduled Tribe 0.33 0.34 0.70
% Hindu 0.65 0.63 0.39
Asset Index 7.52 7.82 0.10
HH Facility Index 2.62 2.63 0.87
% Own Land 0.74 0.69 0.04
Board Exam Score 61.16 61.17 0.98
% Grades Repeated 0.14 0.15 0.69
% Father in Contact 0.91 0.92 0.48
% Father High School 0.18 0.20 0.22
% Father Family Business 0.11 0.14 0.11
% Father Salaried Job 0.21 0.21 0.88
% Mother High School 0.08 0.09 0.91
% Mother Housewife 0.60 0.61 0.51
Average Older Sibling Edu. 5.27 5.20 0.45
Enroll Probability (Tech) 36.96 35.27 0.24
Enroll Probability (Gen) 32.89 32.05 0.47
Enroll Probability (Voc) 22.50 24.16 0.15
Enroll Probability (NA) 7.65 8.53 0.23
% Arts Stream 0.34 0.34 0.84
% Commerce Stream 0.31 0.31 0.99
% Science Stream 0.35 0.35 0.86
Columns (1) and (2) show sample means
Column (3) shows p-values of OLS regressions on a treatment group dummy.
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Table 1.B.2: Balance of Baseline Variables by Stream
Arts Commerce Science
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Control Treatment p-value Control Treatment p-value Control Treatment p-value
Age 17.41 17.35 0.60 17.20 17.42 0.02 17.09 17.16 0.43
% Male 0.48 0.42 0.19 0.48 0.53 0.29 0.63 0.70 0.11
% Scheduled Tribe 0.42 0.47 0.21 0.34 0.26 0.07 0.22 0.27 0.25
% Hindu 0.56 0.47 0.05 0.63 0.65 0.66 0.75 0.75 0.96
Asset Index 6.40 6.37 0.94 7.75 8.34 0.09 8.43 8.76 0.24
HH Facility Index 2.14 2.04 0.52 2.64 2.87 0.19 3.06 2.99 0.66
% Own Land 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.66 0.58 0.07 0.79 0.75 0.20
Board Exam Score 55.74 56.09 0.69 60.77 60.41 0.72 66.82 66.70 0.91
% Grades Repeated 0.18 0.19 0.74 0.14 0.15 0.88 0.10 0.11 0.80
% Father in Contact 0.87 0.90 0.24 0.91 0.93 0.40 0.95 0.93 0.30
% Father High School 0.13 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.18 0.34 0.23 0.22 0.89
% Father Family Business 0.09 0.10 0.79 0.12 0.18 0.09 0.13 0.15 0.47
% Father Salaried Job 0.16 0.16 0.99 0.23 0.21 0.52 0.24 0.27 0.43
% Mother High School 0.04 0.05 0.62 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.22
% Mother Housewife 0.52 0.51 0.93 0.63 0.67 0.37 0.65 0.66 0.76
Average Older Sibling Edu. 4.88 4.75 0.49 5.23 5.08 0.43 5.75 5.80 0.77
Enroll Probability (Tech) 29.75 26.30 0.11 33.95 33.56 0.98 46.67 45.31 0.53
Enroll Probability (Gen) 33.85 34.46 0.77 39.72 37.70 0.34 25.93 24.83 0.58
Enroll Probability (Voc) 25.78 26.96 0.58 19.70 20.26 0.79 21.76 24.88 0.10
Enroll Probability (NA) 10.62 12.28 0.31 6.63 8.48 0.12 5.64 4.98 0.47
Notes: p-values are from OLS regressions on a treatment group dummy.
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Table 1.B.3: Balance of Baseline Variables using the F-test Approach
Dependent variable: treatment group dummy
All Arts Commerce Science
Age 0.0137 -0.0328 0.0669* 0.0291
(0.020) (0.035) (0.036) (0.038)
% Male -0.0237 -0.0757 0.0861 0.0171
(0.044) (0.075) (0.081) (0.091)
% Scheduled Tribe 0.0827* 0.0978 -0.0455 0.148*
(0.050) (0.087) (0.091) (0.088)
% Hindu 0.00925 -0.0519 -0.0128 0.0775
(0.044) (0.080) (0.079) (0.081)
Asset Index 0.0162** 0.0016 0.00948 0.0238*
(0.008) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013)
HH Facility Index -0.0187 -0.00943 0.00968 -0.0274
(0.015) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
% Own Land -0.0491 -0.000787 -0.0735 -0.00928
(0.044) (0.090) (0.076) (0.076)
Board Exam Score -0.00034 0.00302 0.00113 -0.00315
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
% Grades Repeated -0.0602 0.0429 -0.151 -0.117
(0.053) (0.086) (0.098) (0.101)
% Father High School 0.077 0.13 0.0777 0.0303
(0.047) (0.101) (0.084) (0.073)
% Father Family Business 0.123** 0.0304 0.0186 0.268***
(0.062) (0.134) (0.108) (0.100)
% Father Salaried Job 0.0458 -0.0718 0.0796 0.0881
(0.052) (0.111) (0.097) (0.080)
% Mother High School -0.0191 0.151 0.0155 -0.109
(0.068) (0.182) (0.138) (0.089)
% Mother Housewife 0.0153 -0.101 0.0712 0.0371
(0.041) (0.077) (0.078) (0.068)
Average Older Sibling Edu. -0.0173 0.000116 -0.0443* -0.0206
(0.012) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023)
Enroll Probability (Tech) -0.0026 -0.00338 -0.00363 0.00433
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Enroll Probability (Gen) -0.00226 -0.00426* -0.00334 0.00561
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Enroll Probability (Voc) -0.00178 -0.00283 -0.0034 0.00522
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test that all coef. are 0 1.340 0.910 1.160 1.116
p-value of F-test 0.153 0.564 0.298 0.295
Table 1.B.4: Correlates of Students’ Current Stream of Study
Mean(Commerce)-Mean(Arts) Mean(Science)-Mean(Arts) Mean(Science)-Mean(Commerce)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Diff. in Mean p-value Diff. in Mean p-value Diff. in Mean p-value
Age -0.068 0.325 -0.257 0.000 -0.188 0.002
% Male 0.052 0.102 0.217 0.000 0.165 0.000
% Scheduled Tribe -0.149 0.000 -0.201 0.000 -0.052 0.064
% Hindu 0.117 0.000 0.235 0.000 0.118 0.000
Asset Index 1.657 0.000 2.212 0.000 0.554 0.013
HH Facility Index 0.662 0.000 0.934 0.000 0.271 0.019
% Own Land -0.112 0.000 0.036 0.171 0.148 0.000
Board Exam Score 4.682 0.000 10.850 0.000 6.168 0.000
% Grades Repeated -0.042 0.079 -0.081 0.000 -0.039 0.066
% Father in Contact 0.035 0.063 0.050 0.004 0.015 0.344
% Father High School 0.024 0.339 0.069 0.007 0.045 0.091
% Father Family Business 0.057 0.013 0.049 0.023 -0.009 0.724
% Father Salaried Job 0.065 0.019 0.097 0.000 0.032 0.267
% Mother High School 0.032 0.033 0.098 0.000 0.066 0.001
% Mother Housewife 0.129 0.000 0.136 0.000 0.007 0.813
Average Older Sibling Edu. 0.341 0.007 0.950 0.000 0.609 0.000
Enroll Probability (Tech) 5.718 0.000 17.950 0.000 12.232 0.000
Enroll Probability (Gen) 4.558 0.004 -8.775 0.000 -13.333 0.000
Enroll Probability (Voc) -6.388 0.000 -3.038 0.036 3.350 0.013
Enroll Probability (NA) -3.889 0.000 -6.137 0.000 -2.248 0.003
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Table 1.B.5: Baseline Relationship between Enrollment Intentions & Own
Wage Beliefs
Dependent variable: Probability of Enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All Arts Commerce Science All Arts Commerce Science
prob. enjoy coursework 0.444*** 0.317*** 0.450*** 0.548***
(0.0244) (0.0395) (0.0490) (0.0377)
graduation prob. 0.142*** 0.217*** 0.179*** 0.0258
(0.0262) (0.0419) (0.0491) (0.0438)
prob. parental approval 0.256*** 0.218*** 0.261*** 0.262*** 0.417*** 0.411*** 0.426*** 0.393***
(0.0241) (0.0421) (0.0448) (0.0381) (0.0127) (0.0228) (0.0240) (0.0202)
employment prob. 0.123*** 0.0506 0.0878* 0.227*** 0.181*** 0.111*** 0.164*** 0.264***
(0.0284) (0.0470) (0.0526) (0.0453) (0.0209) (0.0340) (0.0390) (0.0353)
log own wage 2.320*** 0.0836 2.711** 4.204*** 2.033*** 0.145 2.659*** 3.843***
(0.733) (1.102) (1.268) (1.491) (0.525) (0.813) (0.931) (1.045)
Constant -49.51*** -15.17 -54.98*** -77.15*** -26.98*** -2.594 -33.63*** -49.88***
(7.130) (10.60) (12.52) (14.64) (4.748) (7.314) (8.405) (9.553)
Observations (student x track) 4,572 1,557 1,407 1,608 6,092 2,076 1,873 2,143
R-squared 0.472 0.382 0.473 0.572 0.344 0.249 0.352 0.431
Non-Attendance Track NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Attendance Tracks YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Student FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
81
1.C Further Results
Table 1.C.6: OLS & Quantile Regressions of Baseline Error on Stream of
Study
Dependent variable: errorT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS q10 q25 q50 q75 q95
Technical Track:
Arts -5.438*** -0.585*** -18.71*** -1.620*** -0.193** -0.516***
(0.640) (0.172) (0.116) (0.287) (0.0980) (0.169)
Commerce -0.885 -0.0543 0 -0.280 -0.0219 -0.138
(0.539) (0.190) (5.310) (0.209) (0.115) (0.134)
Mean for Science 6.843*** -9.793*** 8.676*** 10.49*** 10.95*** 11.89***
(0.354) (0.175) (0.0937) (0.141) (0.0743) (0.116)
General Track:
Arts -4.296*** -0.438*** -3.387*** -16.20** -0.292*** -0.183**
(0.715) (0.132) (0.210) (7.384) (0.0991) (0.0800)
Commerce 0.532 0.148 0 0 0 0
(0.605) (0.173) (6.464) (0.165) (0.108) (0.146)
Mean for Science 4.621*** -9.586*** -6.328*** 9.875*** 10.58*** 11.40***
(0.430) (0.136) (0.220) (0.120) (0.0524) (0.0731)
Vocational Track:
Arts -4.253*** -0.894*** -18.10*** -0.843*** -0.218 0.135
(0.628) (0.196) (0.214) (0.213) (0.143) (0.145)
Commerce 0.104 0 0.479 0.192* 0.0858 0.135
(0.526) (0.201) (0.319) (0.100) (0.0915) (0.131)
Mean for Science 6.868*** -9.104*** 8.627*** 10.15*** 10.84*** 11.52***
(0.352) (0.200) (0.211) (0.101) (0.0821) (0.0956)
Non-Attendance Track:
Arts -2.421*** -0.342*** -0.537*** -4.318* 0 -0.0761
(0.662) (0.0664) (0.193) (2.491) (0.0825) (0.178)
Commerce -0.682 0 -0.296 -0.618 0.101 -0.0513
(0.625) (0.111) (0.262) (0.760) (0.0818) (0.166)
Mean for Science 2.976*** -9.301*** -8.668*** 8.307*** 9.906*** 11.29***
(0.456) (0.0742) (0.197) (0.660) (0.0509) (0.137)
Observations 1,524 1,524 1,524 1,524 1,524 1,524
Notes: Robust Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Reference category is Science.
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Table 1.C.7: Probability of Non-Attendance by Stream
Unconstrained Choice Set Constrained Choice Set
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: NA prob. NA prob. NA prob. NA prob.
Arts 5.992*** 4.574*** 6.551** 0.887
(0.968) (1.043) (2.999) (3.347)
Commerce 2.131*** 1.372* 9.214*** 6.549**
(0.766) (0.802) (3.095) (3.184)
School FE YES YES YES YES
Baseline Controls NO YES NO YES
Observations 1,524 1,524 1,524 1,524
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Reference category is Science.
Table 1.C.8: Effect of the Treatment on Own-Wage Belief Updating (by
Baseline Enrollment Probability)
Unconstrained Choice Set Constrained Choice Set
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: | OwnWageTijt=2 −OwnWageTijt=1 |
treatment#baseline enroll. prob. 0.000616 0.000616 -0.000885** -0.000885**
(0.000667) (0.000671) (0.000434) (0.000437)
School FE YES YES YES YES
Track FE YES YES YES YES
Baseline Controls NO YES NO YES
Observations 3,784 3,784 3,784 3,784
Notes: Clustered Standard Errors in Parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All main effects are included in the model. Sample restricted to Commerce & Science.
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CHAPTER 2
DO STUDENTS OVERESTIMATE POST-SECONDARY
EDUCATION EXPENSES? INSIGHTS FROM SUBJECTIVE &
MEASURED INDIAN DATA
2.1 Introduction
An increasing amount of recent economics literature is interested in analyzing beliefs
about the benefits and costs of education, that students’ subjectively perceive, prior
to the point of making a critical investment in human capital. One use of eliciting
such subjective beliefs is to estimate standard education choice models, wherein in-
dividuals decide on entering a given level of education by weighing benefits against
costs1, using subjective expectations data rather than actual choice data (Manski
(2004), Wiswall and Zafar (2015), Delavande and Zafar (2014)). Here, the use of
subjective expectations, on all alternatives in an individuals’ choice-set, helps cir-
cumvent assumptions about expectation formation and does not assume a mapping
between revealed elements of education utility to beliefs about these elements at
the time the decision was made. Another point of interest in data about subjective
beliefs, which is perhaps more directly amenable to policy intervention, is analyzing
the accuracy of beliefs. Given that individuals’ subjective beliefs are conditioned on
their information sets, imperfect information about some aspect of the benefit or cost
of education is seen as a barrier to education access (Jensen (2010), Oreopoulos and
1See Willis and Rosen (1979) & Altonji (1993) for more traditional approaches using revealed
preference data.
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Dunn (2013) Dinkelman and Mart´ınez (2014), Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman
(2015)).
The accuracy of students’ beliefs about the costs associated with post-secondary ed-
ucation is of primary interest in this paper. The recent literature on analyzing the
accuracy of subjective beliefs regarding education is concentrated more heavily on
the side of studying beliefs about the subjective benefits of education, more specifi-
cally, expected labor market benefits. This includes earlier inquiries by Betts (1996),
and more recent experimental investigations that examine changes in education in-
vestments upon randomizing information on population earnings (Nguyen (2008),
Jensen (2010), Fryer Jr (2013), Loyalka et al. (2013), Oreopoulos and Dunn (2013),
Pekkala Kerr et al. (2015)). The literature on the accuracy about beliefs regarding
other elements of an individual’s education utility function, including beliefs about
costs, is relatively scarce2.
In this paper I combine two datasets to draw insights about the extent and im-
plications of overestimating post-secondary expenses. The first is a self-collected
dataset on high school students’ beliefs regarding post-secondary expenses, condi-
tional on track, elicited 5-9 months before students make an actual decision about
post-secondary enrollment. This data was collected from students studying in schools
located in the east Indian state of Jharkhand. The second is a nationally representa-
2Some research indicates the importance of providing information about financial aid opportu-
nities and eligibility for financial aid (Dinkelman and Mart´ınez (2014)) as well as simplifying the
process of applying for aid in the U.S. (Bettinger et al. (2009)) in reducing high-school absenteeism
and increasing college-enrollment, respectively.
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tive dataset on post-secondary expenses incurred by students studying in the same
tracks. Fortuitously, both datasets were collected during the same year. I use the
nationally representative dataset on measured expenses as a reference distribution
to determine the accuracy of students’ cost beliefs. Naive comparisons indicate that
students’ perceived costs are considerably higher than measured costs, especially
for general academic degrees, which are substantially cheaper than the other two
tracks–technical and vocational. However, comparing every individual’s perceived
costs to an overall distribution of measured expenses disregards the possibility that
some people may rationally expect costs to be lower or higher for them, given their
personal characteristics. To address this, I assign to every individual a measured
cost, from the nationally representative data, of a person most similar in “type to
them, using a set of SES characteristics that overlap both datasets. Using naive and
person-specific predictions of measured costs, for every individual, along with their
cost perceptions and budget for education expenses, I describe the implications of
students’ cost beliefs in determining their perceived affordability for each type of
post-secondary education. Given that students may acquire more information about
tracks most preferred by them, I also estimate a flexible model of track-choice to
estimate each student’s utility maximizing track. With this, I draw implications
of students’ errors regarding post-secondary costs, in determining their perceived
affordability, for their most preferred or utility maximizing track.
This paper uniquely combines three pieces of subjective beliefs data–students’ be-
liefs regarding the cost of education, students’ beliefs about their capacity to pay
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for this type of education and students’ beliefs about out of pocket expenses net of
scholarships/stipends. This helps us draw insights that add to the limited literature
analyzing subjective cost beliefs. Two papers are of notable interest here. Bleemer
and Zafar (2015) randomize information about the average annual net cost of at-
tending a 4-year public university and that of a 4 year nonprofit private university,
in 2014, in the United States. They find that, on average, U.S. household heads
overestimate the costs associated with public colleges and revise beliefs about their
child’s college costs as a result of the cost information, but do not revise expecta-
tions regarding college enrollment. The paper cannot comment on misperceptions
regarding cost beliefs relative to household’s budget and ability to pay for college,
which might be one reason for why the authors do not see an increase in expected
college enrollment. Hastings et al. (2015) provide descriptive insights on the link
between overestimation of college costs and matriculation in a degree program in
Chile3. They show that those who overestimate costs by at least 25% are 5.5 per-
centage points less likely to matriculate in a degree program, as compared to those
who perceive costs accurately. However, because they cannot rule out that other
determinants of matriculation may be correlated with cost overestimates, it is not
clear whether students who did not matriculate did so because they believed that
college was unaffordable or because those who overestimated costs were also limited
in their ability to matriculate in other ways. While the approach adopted in this
paper is also descriptive, it addresses more directly the link between overestimation
3Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman (2015) also have an experimental paper, a companion to
the descriptive piece, which randomizes information on earnings and costs together, and does not
address imperfect information about costs separately.
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of costs and perceptions about affordability. Moreover, Hastings et al. (2015) cannot
comment on the extent to which students’ deviations of perceptions from “actual”
costs reflects their private information about aid access.
In my analysis I find that students perceived expenses of post-secondary education
are substantially higher than measured expenses, though track-specific differences
are substantial. The average difference between the two is the highest for general
academic degrees, where the ratio of the median of perceived to measured expenses
is over 6, compared to a ratio of 1.4-1.03 for technical and vocational tracks, respec-
tively. While students do accurately perceive the ranking of expenses of the three
different tracks, they do not perceive correctly the extent to which costs differ, by
track. For instance, in the measured data, general degrees are 7.6 times cheaper
than technical tracks and roughly 6 times cheaper than vocational tracks. However,
students perceive that general degrees are around 1.6 times cheaper than techni-
cal tracks and cost almost equal to vocational tracks (are 1.02 times cheaper). I
estimate that if students perceived expenses more accurately, then their perceived
affordability for technical tracks and general tracks would increase by 10 percentage
points and 55 percentage points, respectively, though for vocational tracks students
already have accurate perceptions about costs. Also, students have relatively more
accurate beliefs about the expenses associated with their utility maximizing track or
their most preferred track, which I estimate using a flexible model of track-choice. If
students perceived expenses more accurately, then 15 percentage point more people
would believe their utility maximizing track to be affordable to them, though all of
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this increase is on account of general degrees.
A few issues need to be addressed headfirst. The first regards parental beliefs about
educational expenses and how they differ from their children’s. That we lack data on
this is a weakness of the data. Nevertheless, previous research indicates the impor-
tance of adolescent beliefs in determining attendance at higher levels of education.
Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009) use subjective expectations data from Mexico to si-
multaneously control for youth and parents’ expectations of earnings in determining
high school and college enrollment decisions. They find that while both expectations
matter for high school enrollment, only the youths’ expectations matter for college
enrollment. Other papers that show important agency of children relative to parents
in education decisions include Berry (2015), Giustinelli (2016) and Dinkelman and
Mart´ınez (2014). Youth may also be more informed than their parents on account of
being more educated–67% of fathers and 87% of mothers are less educated than their
children for my sample of youth. Another issue has to do with the timing of collec-
tion of beliefs data. It is likely that students will acquire more information about
costs at the time of making at actual decision. While this is true, students and their
families might be less likely to acquire information about tracks that they consider
unaffordable to begin with and beliefs held at prior stages may impact prefigurative
and preparatory commitment (Grodsky and Jones (2007)) and intermediate deci-
sions. A final comment concerns interchangeable use of perceived “expenses” versus
“costs” in this paper. While I use both terms, strictly we are referring to expenses
incurred here and not the sticker prices of degrees and other items of expenditure.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2.2 provides some institutional
background, section 2.3 discusses details of both data sources used, section 2.4 de-
scribes estimation, section 2.5 presents results and the final section concludes.
2.2 Background
Figure 2.1 presents descriptives on the proportion of Indians attending post-
secondary education4. As is apparent, a strong wealth gradient exists in post-
secondary enrollment. Unconditionally, only 6% of individuals belonging to the
poorest wealth quintile enroll, compared with 32% in the richest wealth quintile.
Conditional on high school completion, this proportion varies from 52% to 76% be-
tween the poorest and richest quintiles.
Broadly, post-secondary education consists of three tracks in the country– (i) techni-
cal or professional degrees, (ii) general academic degrees and (iii) vocational diplomas
or certificate courses. Technical degree courses include professional degrees in fields
like medicine, engineering and architecture as well as “job-oriented degrees like Bach-
elors of Computer Application, Business Administration, Information-Technology
(IT), Pharmacy or Hotel Management. These degrees are regulated by the All-India
Council for Technical Education (AICTE). The majority of individuals enrolled
4Kaufmann (2014) compares some Latin American countries with the OECD in terms of atten-
dance rates in the 18-24 age group. Attendance rates in India, at 18%, are somewhat higher than
Brazil’s (16%), but are lower than those of Colombia, Peru, Mexico and Chile. The OECD average
is 56%.
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in technical degrees attend private institutions. General degree courses are non-
technical and award a bachelors degree in either the arts, sciences or commerce,
further categorized according to subject. A little less than half of all students en-
rolled in these degrees attend private institutes. Vocational courses are not academic
and focus on imparting a set of skills (rather than broader academic knowledge) tar-
geted towards employment in a specific sector. Under the government, these courses
are offered either by Industrial Training Institutes/Centers (ITI/ITC) or by Poly-
technics. The fraction of students enrolled in private institutes for each degree are
given in Table 2.1. It is important to note that the fraction of private institutes in
Jharkhand is much lower than the all-India average for technical and general tracks,
but slightly higher for vocational tracks.
Measured wage premiums for technical degrees are more than a 100% of the wages
of those who complete high school. Despite the fact that vocational training is more
expensive than general degree courses, wage premiums for vocational courses (42%
of high-school wage) are around 8 percentage points lower than the wage premiums
for general courses.
Admissions into post-secondary education involve a mix of applications based on
final scores in 12th grade examinations and institute-specific written examinations.
Students’ apply to a attend specific degree-institute pairs. The elicitation of sub-
jective data in this paper took place prior to students took their final 12th grade
exams or applied to post-secondary institutes. The strong wealth gradient in post-
secondary enrollment in part owes to the lack of systematic financial aid to attend
91
such education. Between 16-20% of individuals receive some type of scholarship in
the country and in Jharkhand this fraction is even lower (2-7%). More details about
the fraction of students receiving scholarships and waivers are discussed in section
2.3.2.
2.3 Data
This analysis makes use of two datasets–one measures subjective beliefs regarding
post-secondary education expenses, and the second collects actual data on post-
secondary expenses faced by students enrolled in this type of education. The first
dataset on subjective beliefs is a self-collected dataset on 1525 12th grade students5
drawn from 9 government schools in the east Indian state of Jharkhand, and was
collected between October 2014 and February 2015. Hereafter, it is referred to as
the “survey sample”. The second dataset was collected by the Indian government’s
National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) between January-June 2014, with the ob-
jectives of garnering data on the (a) participation of persons aged 5-29 years in the
pursuit of education, and (b) private expenditure incurred on the education of house-
5Specifically, these students were studying in the final year of their “intermediate degree” in
what are known as “intermediate colleges”. After completing 10th grade, students chose between
attending either an “intermediate college, for two years of higher-secondary schooling, or attending
a high school which offers 11th and 12th grades. Public “intermediate colleges, like the ones surveyed
here, are often co-located with public colleges offering undergraduate degrees. Since intermediate
education is equivalent to higher secondary education, I refer to these students as being in 12th
grade, throughout the paper, and also refer to the “intermediate colleges” as “government/public
schools”, to avoid confusing terminology as most people think of colleges as referring to only post-
secondary education. All 9 government schools in this survey are affiliated with Ranchi University,
a large state university.
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hold members. This NSSO dataset is also referred to as the 71st NSS round, here
we simply refer to it as the “NSS dataset”. The close overlap in the timing of the
collection of the two datasets is fortuitous–nationally representative data on educa-
tion expenses is rarely collected in the country (it was last collected a decade ago in
2007-08) and more regularly collected datasets on overall consumption expenditures,
would be unsuitable for the current analysis. Firstly, they do not contain detailed
measures of education expenses and, secondly, they do not follow a sampling frame
that yields sufficient observations on post-secondary students in the country.
2.3.1 The Survey Sample
The first dataset, the survey sample, was collected with the explicit intention of ex-
amining in detail subjective beliefs regarding post-secondary education, of 12th grade
students, 5-9 months (depending on survey date) before graduating from high-school
and making an actual decision regarding enrollment in post-secondary education. A
total of nine schools participated in the survey. Four of the nine schools are situ-
ated in the capital city of Ranchi, one in a rural block of Ranchi district and four
others are in surrounding rural districts. We drew, approximately, an equal number
of students from each school. Further, within each school, students were randomly
assigned to survey-sessions of 15 students each. An information experiment was em-
bedded in the survey, with survey-sessions being assigned to either a control session
or a treatment session. However, the current analysis, makes use only of the baseline
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data, which was collected identically across both groups. Details of the experiment
are in a separate paper, here we focus on baseline variables most relevant to the
current analysis.
The baseline survey consisted of two main modules- the first module was focused on
collecting socio-economic details of the students and the second was focused on belief
elicitation about different aspects of post-secondary education. Among the socio-
economic variables, we collected data on student gender, caste, religion, a household
assets and facilities module, parental education and occupation, older sibling gen-
der and education, scores on previous centralized board examinations and history of
grade repetition. In the second part, belief elicitation was contingent on each post-
secondary alternative i.e. technical/professional degrees, general degrees, vocational
diplomas/certificate courses and the fourth alternative of not attending further edu-
cation after 12th grade. The three post-secondary education tracks were constructed
to maintain consistency with classifications maintained by National Sample Survey
Office. Nevertheless, for elicitation purposes, the categories are broad and encompass
a variety of courses of study. Therefore, data collection was preceded by a detailed
explanation of possible courses/degrees that are part of every category. Since a ma-
jority of the beliefs questions were either probabilistic in nature or required students
to express responses on a scale of 0-100, the baseline beliefs module was also preceded
by a discussion (with examples) on answering probabilistic questions.6
6We ensured that answers to all probabilistic questions sum to 100 by placing the total as
a constraint in the questionnaire, without fulfilling which, the survey would not proceed to the
subsequent question.
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In the baseline beliefs module, stated probabilities of enrollment were elicited by
specifying all three post-secondary alternatives as being in all individuals’ feasible
choice-set.7 Next, individuals were asked about certain non-pecuniary and pecu-
niary beliefs conditional on hypothetical enrollment in each alternative. Pecuniary
beliefs included data on expected probability of employment and expected average
monthly earnings at age 30.8 Non-pecuniary beliefs included questions regarding
likelihood of enjoyment of coursework (0-100 scale), likelihood of parental approval
of education track (0-100 scale) and likelihood of being able to pass (graduate from)
the course/degree (0-100 scale). I use this data to estimate each individual’s utility
maximizing track, as described in section 2.4.1.
Finally, the two most important survey questions from the point of view of this
analysis concern the elicitation of beliefs regarding post-secondary expenses and be-
liefs regarding students’ budgets for post-secondary study. The elicitation of beliefs
regarding expected post-secondary expenses, by track, stressed that students must
express beliefs about yearly out-of-pocket expenses, including course fee and other
miscellaneous costs. The exact wording was:
7The exact wording of the question used to elicit enrollment probabilities for potentially hypo-
thetically choice sets of individuals was: “Think ahead to next year when you have completed (sic)
intermediate. Imagine that you have passed your (sic) intermediate examinations and are able to
secure admission in one degree/course belonging to each of the options 1, 2 and 3. Option 4 is
also available to you. Suppose that you are provided with financial aid such that all your expenses
(tuition, boarding, room, etc.) are paid for at a private/government institute for a course belonging
to each options 1, 2 and 3. State the percent chance that you would enroll in each of the following?”
This statement was followed by the four education options among which students had to allocate
probabilities.
8For e.g. the question used to elicit own earnings beliefs was: Consider the situation where you
graduate from a degree belonging to the alternative insert track. Look ahead to when you will be
30 years old. Think about the types of jobs associated with degree/course. How much do you think
YOU would earn per MONTH on AVERAGE, if you completed a degree of this type?
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[1] “Think about the yearly expenses (including fees, hostel and other expenses asso-
ciated with a degree/course belonging to each of the three alternatives listed below.
If you are enrolled in a degree/course belonging to each alternative (in an insti-
tute/college of your choosing), then how much do you think that you and your family
would have to spend on a yearly basis? If scholarships/loans are possible, please
subtract the amount you are likely to receive: 1. Technical/Professional degree 2.
General degree 3. Vocational diploma/certificate course.”
To elicit beliefs about students’ yearly budget or maximum feasible amount that
they expect to be able to pay for post-secondary education, the following question
was posed:
[2] “What is the maximum yearly amount (including fees, hostel and other expenses)
that you and your family would be able to pay, for you to be enrolled in a degree/course
after intermediate, without taking any loan?”
2.3.2 NSS Data
The NSS dataset provides us with estimates of actual expenses incurred by indi-
viduals pursuing post-secondary education in the country, and serves as a reference
distribution for comparison with high-school students’ perceptions about expenses
from the survey sample. The survey collects expenditure data from 5-29 year old
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individuals currently attending education at the primary level and above.9 As listed
in Table 2.1, total expenditure for a year is collected as a sum of item-wise expenses
on (i) course fee10, (ii) books, stationery and uniform, (iii) transport, (iv) private
coaching and (v) other expenses. The “other expenses” category includes miscella-
neous expenses such as payment for a study tour or a compulsory “donation” (often a
bribe) paid for which no valid receipt was provided. Though the elicitation of subjec-
tive beliefs in the survey-sample emphasized that students report their perceptions
about total yearly expenses, the item-wise break-down of expenses collected in the
NSS data is more detailed than in the survey sample. This difference in format works
against us being able to establish over-estimation of education expenses on the part
of students in the survey sample. 97% of all courses are full-time courses, and 94%
of courses have a minimum duration of 12 months. The NSS data, for the purposes
of calculating yearly expenses, is limited to this sample.
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics on item-wise and total yearly expenses. Total
expenditure on the general track is several folds lower than on technical degrees and
vocational diplomas. Median yearly expenses incurred in pursuing a general degree
are 6 times lower than expenses associated with technical degrees, and 3 times lower
than expenses on vocational diplomas. The difference in course fees for the general
track, as compared to the other two tracks, is even starker. Median course fees for
the technical track are over 12 times higher than for the general track and the median
9Data is collected for one “basic course” per individual, defined by a list of criteria to circumvent
ambiguity. For instance, If an individual is pursuing more than one course, then the course which
is at the highest level is considered to be the basic course.
10includes tuition fee, examination fee, development fee and other compulsory payments
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course fee for vocational tracks are 6 times higher than for the general track. In line
with the all-India numbers, pursuing a general degree in Jharkhand is much cheaper
than technical and vocational tracks–the former is almost 7.5 times more expenses
and the latter over 6 times. For technical and vocational tracks, course fees form the
highest item of expenditure followed by money paid for private tuition. Expenses on
private coaching are even higher than regular course fee for those in general tracks.
To maintain comparability with the elicitation of out-of-pocket expenses in the survey
sample, expenses net of scholarships, stipends and reimbursements are calculated.
The fraction of students receiving scholarships is 16.5%-20% at the all-India level,
but relatively small (2%-7%) in Jharkhand (Table 2.1). However, for those who re-
ceive scholarships, the amount received is relatively large–on average about a third
of total yearly expenses. A small fraction of students also receive some amount of tu-
ition waivers and subsidies for textbooks. The expenses recorded in the NSS data are
amounts actually incurred by households. Another piece of useful data in the NSS
regards whether students attend government or private institutes, which constitutes
an important source of variation in total expenses incurred. While students’ beliefs
about expenses are not elicited separately for government and private institutes, I use
this piece of information from the NSS dataset to compare students’ perceived belief
distributions to two separate distributions of actual expenses, government and pri-
vate, providing illustrative extremes around the extent of overestimation of expenses
on the part of students.
The NSS dataset also collects a rich set of variables on household characteristics,
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including measurement of socio-economic status (SES). I include in my analysis,
SES variables that overlap with those collected in the survey sample. This includes
student gender, caste, religion, parental education and household occupation, as well
as state of residence. These SES variables are used to make out of sample predictions
of measured costs from the NSS data to students in the survey sample, as described
in further detail in section 2.4.2.
2.4 Estimation
2.4.1 Estimating Students’ Utility Maximizing Track
While we collect data on every students’ beliefs regarding post-secondary expenses
for each of the three tracks, it is additionally informative to investigate the extent
to which students’ beliefs about expenses impacts their perceptions about the af-
fordability of the track that they would most prefer to pursue. Towards this end,
I estimate students’ utility maximizing track using data on their stated enrollment
probabilities across track, track-specific beliefs about pecuniary factors (expected
earnings at age 30 and likelihood of finding employment) and non-pecuniary fac-
tors (likelihood of enjoying associated coursework, of being able to graduate and of
parental approval), as well as student-specific co-variate controls.
The estimating equation is derived from a model of utility maximizing behavior and
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I follow the estimation procedure recommended in (Blass, Lach and Manski (2010))
for the modeling of elicited choice-probabilities.
The utility that student i derives from pursuing track j with j = 1, ..J , has the
random-coefficients form:
Uij = xijβi + εij (2.1)
where xij = x(vij, si) is a function of observed track-specific beliefs (vij) and student-
specific attributes (si). Stated choice analysis asks that student i provide to the
researcher a utility maximizing choice and hence the implicit assumption is that i
knows the value of both xi and εi. On the other hand, eliciting choice probabilities
enables respondents to express uncertainty about εi. Blass, Lach and Manski (2010)
call this “resolvable uncertainty” or uncertainty about variables that the student
does not know at the time of elicitation but expects to know at the time of making
an actual choice.
Given a subjective distribution for εi, student i derives the subjective probability
that they would chose j and reports this as their choice probability qij. Therefore,
with the utility function in Equation 2.1 the subjective choice probability qij is given
by:
qij = Qi[xijβi + εij > xikβi + εik], all k 6= j] (2.2)
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To estimate Equation 2.2 using elicited choice-probabilities, an i.i.d extreme value
distribution can be assumed for Qi (or εi) which is restrictive, but in line with the
assumption made in much of the choice-modelling literature. With this, the choice
probabilities have the following multinomial logit form:
qij =
exijβi∑j
h=1 e
xihβi
, j = 1, ..J (2.3)
To model the probability of pursuing track j relative to a base alternative 1 (in this
case non-attendance), a log odds transformation to Equation 2.3 can be applied,
which yields:
ln
(qij
qi1
)
= (xij − xi1)βi, j = 2, ..J (2.4)
Equation 2.4 is of the linear mixed-model form which can also be written in an
error-components format with βi = b+ ηi. Therefore we have:
ln
(qij
qi1
)
= (xij − xi1)b+ uij, j = 2, ..J (2.5)
with uij = (xij − xi1)ηi. uij is the stochastic portion of the utility which introduces
correlation in utility across tracks and within student. Hence, estimation of this type
does not suffer from the restrictive “Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)”
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property of multinomial logit (Train (2003)). The mean-zero assumption E(η) = 0,
implies that b = E(β), E(u|x) = 0 and Equation 2.5 yields the linear mean regression
model (OLS with random effects):
E
[
ln
(qij
qi1
)
|x
]
= (xij − xi1)b (2.6)
In the first specification, Equation 2.6 is used to estimate students’ utility maximiz-
ing track. With stated choice-analysis (or when only observation per individual is
observed) parametric assumptions about the shape of β need to be made in order to
estimate a mixed-logit model which does not suffer from the IIA assumption. Here,
this parametric assumption is not made.
The log-odds function is sensitive to choice-probabilities at the [0,1] boundaries, gen-
erating log-odds that are equal to minus or plus infinity. To avoid dropping these ob-
servations, 0 and 1 values are replaced with values near to these boundaries. This can
bias least-square estimates. Therefore, Blass, Lach and Manski (2010) recommend
estimating a median regression, which is robust to order preserving replacements.
This forms our second specification of estimating students’ utility maximizing track.
M
[
ln
(qij
qi1
)
|x
]
= (xij − xi1)b (2.7)
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2.4.2 Predicting Expenses from NSS Data
The second piece of econometric analysis that requires some explanation is the out of
sample prediction of expenses from the NSS dataset, to the survey sample of students
from Jharkhand. The basic idea is to assign to each individual a value of “measured
expenses”, which most closely approximates the expenses faced by students of their
“type”. This is to facilitate a comparison of more relevant “measured expenses”
with the students’ “perceived expenses”. For example, out-of-pocket post-secondary
expenses likely differ by caste in India, because the Indian government sometimes11
provides scholarships or stipends to students from socially disadvantaged castes.
Hence, it makes sense to compare perceived expenses of a student from a certain
caste to the expenses faced by students of the same caste.
Even though some scholarships are available, the extent of financial aid for post-
secondary education is relatively small. While nationally around 18% of students
in post-secondary education get some scholarships, this figure is only around 5%
in Jharkhand. In the presence of significant out-of-pocket expenses and variation
in costs on account of specific course within track, and institute (e.g. government
versus private) attended, a more important source of variation in measured costs is
likely on account of the fact that richer students may attend higher quality courses
and colleges/institutes.
11According to the NSS dataset 18.69% of all students in post-secondary education received some
scholarship and 80% of all those who receive scholarships do so on account of their caste status.
Around 94% of all scholarships are provided by the government.
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Working within the constraint that variables common to both datasets are required
to assign measured costs from the NSS data to students in the survey sample, and
that these variables explain only around 10-13 percent of the variation in measured
costs, I perform the following analysis:
I first estimate, separately for each track j, median out-of-pocket expenses (Y MEDijNSS),
that are net of scholarships / stipends / reimbursements received, as a function of
k predictors– sex, caste, religion, father’s education, mother’s education, state of
residence, and household occupation12, with εijNSS being error term:
Y MEDijNSS = αjNSS + β1jNSSX1ijNSS..+ βkjNSSXkijNSS + εijNSS (2.8)
The parameters β1jNSS..βkjNSS are then used to predict costs for students in the
survey sample:
̂Y MEDijsurvey = αjNSS + β1jNSSX1ijsurvey..+ βkjNSSXkijsurvey (2.9)
Even though expenses faced by students in Jharkhand state likely form the most
relevant reference distribution for students in the survey sample, I do not restrict
the analysis to Jharkhand specific NSS observations. This is because data on post-
12The variable on household occupation differs between the NSS and survey dataset. In the NSS
dataset, household occupation is the occupation from which the household derives the majority of
its income, in the survey dataset it is the occupation of the father.
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secondary attendees from Jharkhand forms less than 2% of the national sample
of students in post-secondary education. Given the similarity in the structure of
post-secondary education across states and the possibility that students may pursue
education out of state, it makes sense to use all observations on post-secondary
expenses available. Instead, the coefficient on Jharkhand state is estimated and is
used as one explanatory factor in prediction of student-specific measured costs. The
remaining parameters are estimated using data for all of India.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Perceived vs. Measured Expenses: A First Take
Figure 2.2 (technical), Figure 2.3 (general), and Figure 2.4 (vocational), present
cumulative distribution function (CDF) plots comparing perceived expenses (from
survey sample data) to measured expenses (from NSS data), by post-secondary track.
For all three tracks, the perceived expenses distribution (blue) appears to stochas-
tically dominate the measured expenses distribution (red), when we consider NSS
data from all of India, with the largest difference in the distributions evident for the
general degree track. When restricting the NSS data sample to only post-secondary
students in Jharkhand, the dominance of the perceived expenses distribution is un-
clear for the technical and vocational tracks, though for the general degree track,
the dominance of the perceived distribution is starkly evident. At every percentile,
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students perceive general degrees to be more expensive than they actually are, ir-
respective of whether we consider students’ expenditures across the country or in
Jharkhand state.
Table 2.2 formalizes the difference in perceived and measured distributions using
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests. Columns 1-4 test directional hypothesis regarding
whether the perceived expenses distribution contains smaller (column 2) or larger
(column 4) values than the measured expenses distribution, whereas column 5 tests
a combined hypothesis of the maximum difference between the two distributions.
When considering the measured earnings averaged nationally, the two distributions
are statistically unequal, and the relevant p-values support the directional hypothesis
that the perceived expenses distribution contains larger values13. When considering
measured earnings only for Jharkhand state, the conclusion holds for technical and
general tracks, but perceived and measured expenses for the vocational track are
statistically identical.
While it does seem to be apparent that in most cases, expenses perceived by stu-
dents in the survey sample are greater than those actually incurred by students
studying in post-secondary tracks, the extent to which these perceived expenses im-
pact perceptions about affordability of a track are unclear. In Table 2.3, I illustrate
how perceptions about affordability of a track would change if individuals believed
that the median person’s expenses applied to them. For this, the fraction of indi-
13Directional hypothesis for the technical track are inconclusive, though the largest difference
between the two distributions (D-Stat 2) indicates larger values for the perceived distribution.
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viduals who perceive each track as affordable is computed, first using data on cost
perceptions of students, and then by replacing cost perceptions with the median of
measured costs, for each student.14 I do this for an overall distribution averaged
across institute type and separately for expenses incurred by those studying in gov-
ernment and private institutes. While perception about expenses are not collected
conditional on institute type, and the survey-sample likely contains a mix of individ-
uals intending to pursue government and private degrees, I perform this exercise to
provide an illustrative extreme around the extent of overestimation. In other words,
how would affordability of a track change under one extreme assumption of everyone
anchoring perceptions on attending government institutes? How would affordabil-
ity of a track change under the other extreme of everyone anchoring perceptions on
attending private institutes?
Change in perceived affordability on account of replacing cost perceptions with me-
dian measured costs is the highest for the general track, which would be affordable
to 52 percent points more individuals, had individuals perceived their expenses as
equal to the median person’s. This increase is less dramatic for the vocational track
(19 percentage points) and more so for the technical track (6 percentage points) (col-
umn 1, Table 2.3). Under the extreme possibility that all students report perceived
expenses by anchoring their beliefs on attending private institutes, there is still an in-
crease in affordability when individuals’ cost perceptions are replaced with measured
expenses of those who attend only private institutes. Affordability for the general
14A track is affordable if (max. amount families can pay)-(perceived/measured cost of track) ≥
0
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and vocational track increases by 43 percentage points and 10 percentage points re-
spectively, though the increase in affordability of the technical track is statistically
insignificant (column 3, Table 2.3).
I use the median rather than the mean to summarize measured/actual expense dis-
tributions, from the NSS data, owing to skewness of the expense distributions to the
right. Kernel densities in Figure 2.5-Figure 2.7 show that the median is a better
measure of central location of the data.
Section 2.5.3 refines the above analysis in two ways. Currently, it is assumed that
all individuals perceive the median person’s costs as applicable to them. Doing so
disregards the possibility that some people may rationally expect costs to be lower
or higher for them, given their personal characteristics. Therefore, the existence of
higher values of the perceived distribution relative to the median of the measured
distribution, does not immediately lend itself to the possibility that students overes-
timate education expenses. Therefore, firstly, I attempt to assign to every individual
a measured cost, from the NSS data, of a person most similar in “type” to them. In
doing so, I also estimate a parameter for state of residence, and assign to all indi-
viduals predicted measured costs that are adjusted for their residence in Jharkhand
state. Secondly, so far, we have discussed implications of replacing perceived with
measured costs for all three tracks in an individual’s choice set. I extend this analy-
sis to illustrate implications for an individual’s utility maximizing track or the track
they would most prefer to pursue. Section 2.5.2 discusses results from estimating the
choice model described in section 2.4.1.
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2.5.2 Students’ Utility Maximizing Tracks
Parameters of the choice-model, resultant from estimating Equation 2.6, are tabled
in column 1, Table 2.4. Results from the alternative model in Equation 2.7, are
tabled in column 2, Table 2.4. While the qualitative significance of coefficients in
Table 2.4 are both hard to interpret (owing to the log-odds specification) and not
of central importance in this paper (we are more interested in the distribution of
utility maximizing tracks), it is nevertheless useful to provide some interpretation.
All three track-specific non-pecuniary beliefs are expressed on a probability scale
(0-100). Interpreting coefficients from column 2, Table 2.4, the perceived likelihood
of being able to pass all examinations in order to graduate, is not a statistically
significant predictor of stated enrollment. Among non-pecuniary factors, parental
approval is important–a 10 percentage points increase in the probability of parental
approval for a track (relative to non-enrollment) increases the log-odds of stated
enrollment by 0.19%, whereas the increase for a commensurate change in perceived
enjoyment of coursework is 0.14%. Relative to non-pecuniary beliefs, the beliefs
regarding employment probability (also 0-100 scale), bear a still smaller association
with intended enrollment. A 10 percentage points increase in the probability of
employment for a track (relative to non-enrollment) increases the log-odds of stated
enrollment by 0.06%. Individuals are sensitive to expected age-30 earnings: a 1%
increase in expected monthly earnings is associated with a 0.9% increase in the log-
odds of stated enrollment.
I use the parameter estimates in Table 2.4 to derive the predicted probability of en-
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rollment in each track15 and the utility maximizing track per individual, which is the
track with the highest predicted probability of enrollment. These results are reported
in Table 2.5. The main difference between the raw stated enrollment probabilities
and the predicted enrollment probabilities, is a higher predicted enrollment in the
vocational track and lower likelihood of non-enrollment (by 5 percentage points).
The difference between the linear mixed model and the quantile regression model
is negligible, though I use the utility maximizing tracks predicted by the quantile
regression model in further analysis.
2.5.3 Overestimation of Education Expenses: Extent & Im-
plications
2.5.3.1 Prediction of Individual-Specific Costs
Results from estimating Equation 2.8 are presented in Table 2.6. The coefficient
values tabled show parameter estimates used to predict relevant measured costs for
students in the survey sample. As discussed earlier, in section 2.4.2, variation in
measured expenses could arise from several different sources, but we are restricted
in this analysis to explain this variation as a function of variables common to both
datasets–the survey sample and the NSS dataset. For instance, holding the type
of institute and course/degree constant, those belonging to socially disadvantaged
castes and poorer families could have fewer out of pocket expenses as compared to
15As described in Equation 2.3.
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upper caste and richer households, on account of receiving government scholarships
and stipends. However, given that the fraction of students receiving scholarships is
relatively small, larger out-of-pocket expenses for better off SES groups is likely on
account of sorting into better quality institutes and courses/degrees.
Parameter estimates in Table 2.6 are in line with expectation. Relative to males,
households of females in all three tracks spend less money on post-secondary educa-
tion. Relative to the median of each track, females spend between 8.5% (vocational)
to 12.5% (technical and general) less money than males per year. While education
expenses of scheduled castes (SC) do not statistically differ from those belonging to
the scheduled tribe (ST) group, the upper castes spend significantly larger amounts.
Relative to STs, the education expenses of those belonging to the “General” caste
category are higher by between 25% (technical) and 53% (vocational), relative to
median expenses by track. Religion bears no consistent association with education
expenses. Children of educated parents spend more, and significant differences in
education expenses kick in at lower levels of mothers’ education as compared to fa-
thers’. Significant differences in expenses exist between children of fathers with no
formal education and children of fathers with post-secondary training. On the other
hand, significant differences in expenses exist between children of mothers with no
formal schooling and children of mothers with secondary schooling. For instance,
relative to children of fathers with no formal schooling, children of fathers with a
bachelor’s degree spend between 22% (technical) to 47% (vocational) more, relative
to median expenses by track.
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Relative to farming households, households self-employed in the non-agricultural
sector or those with salaried/wage employment do not spend statistically different
amounts on post-secondary education. Households engaged in “casual labor in agri-
culture” spend less money (not statistically significant) as do households engaged in
“casual labor in agriculture”, relative to farming households. Relative to farming
households, households working in “casual labor in agriculture” or agricultural labor
households spend between 18.5%-19% less on technical and vocational education, re-
spectively. Finally, the parameters on state of residence are omitted from Table 2.6
but are an important explanatory variable for the prediction of individual-specific
costs. Recall from Table 2.1 how median expenses in Jharkhand compare to the
all-India average. Out-of-pocket expenses on technical education in Jharkhand are
somewhat higher than the all-India average (by 3.6%), expenses on general education
are lower (by 15%), and considerably higher for vocational education (by 42%).
These parameter estimates are then used as per Equation 2.9 to predict person-
specific costs that serve as a relevant comparison for students perceptions about
expenses and guide us in investigating the extent to which students might overesti-
mate post secondary expenses.
2.5.3.2 Overestimation of Education Expenses
In Table 2.7 we examine how perceptions about affordability of a track change when
individuals’ elicited cost perceptions are replaced with their predicted person-specific
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measured costs ( ̂Y MEDijsurvey), constructed using Equation 2.9. Here, we see a statistically
significant increase in affordability of technical tracks, by 10 percentage points, and a
large and statistically significant increase in the affordability of general tracks, by 55
percentage points The increase in affordability for the vocational track is small and
statistically insignificant. These calculations make it apparent that students’ in the
survey sample have accurate perceptions about expenses associated with vocational
degrees, somewhat overestimate technical degree expenses, and grossly overestimate
expenses associated with the general track.
While it is useful to examine separately, for each post-secondary track, students’
(mis)perceptions about yearly expenses, it is more insightful to study the extent to
which students’ misperceive expenses associated with their most preferred track. This
is because students may acquire more information about tracks most preferred by
them. In Table 2.8 we examine how perceptions about affordability of students’ util-
ity maximizing track changes when individuals’ elicited cost perceptions are replaced
with their predicted person-specific measured costs ( ̂Y MEDijsurvey). Doing so results in
a statistically significant increase of 15 percentage points in students’ perceived af-
fordability of the track they would most like to pursue. Almost all of this increase
is driven by students’ who would most prefer to pursue the general track, though
these students form a small subset of the overall pool of students who misperceive
general degree costs. Students who would most prefer to pursue the technical and
vocational tracks perceive costs associated with these tracks accurately.
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper describes the subjective beliefs of a sample of Indian high school students
about expenses associated with post-secondary education in the country. The paper
describes the extent to which students’ seem to overestimate expenses, relative to
a reference distribution of students currently attending post-secondary education.
Together with data of students’ subjective beliefs about their capacity to pay for
education, the paper describes the implications of overestimating costs on students’
beliefs about their financially feasible choice-sets and affordability of their most pre-
ferred track. Students’ subjective perceptions about their likelihood of receiving
scholarships is also taken into account to compare perceptions about out-of-pocket
expenses with out-of-pocket measured expenses.
In my analysis I find that the extent of students’ inaccuracy of cost beliefs differs
importantly by post-secondary track. More specifically, students make the largest
errors for the general degree track, and fail to perceive that these type of degrees are
substantially cheaper to enroll in as compared to technical and vocational degrees.
I estimate that if students perceived expenses more accurately, then their perceived
affordability for technical tracks and general tracks would increase by 10 percentage
points and 55 percentage points, respectively, though for vocational tracks students
have accurate perceptions about costs at the outset. In addition, I estimate students’
utility maximizing tracks using a flexible model of track-choice. I used the methodol-
ogy proposed by Blass, Lach and Manski (2010) to model stated probabilities, which
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is simple to estimate, allows unstructured correlations between alternatives “within”
individual and allows individuals to express uncertainty about a decision they will
be making in the future. Students have relatively more accurate beliefs about the
expenses associated with their most preferred track. If students perceived expenses
more accurately, then 15 percentage points more people would believe their utility
maximizing track to be affordable to them. To use as reference a measure of actual
costs more relevant to an individual than an overall distribution of costs, I assign
to every individual a predicted value of measured costs using the set of SES charac-
teristics that overlap both datasets–the survey sample of subjective beliefs and the
NSS dataset on measured expenses.
While the paper goes beyond the existing literature in discussing the overestimation
of expenses in concurrence with its implications for perceived affordability of edu-
cation, the main drawback of the analysis is that it stops short of linking perceived
unaffordability with real enrollment decisions of students.
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Figures & Tables for Chapter 2
Figure 2.1: Proportion of Indians Attending Post-Secondary Education by
Wealth Quintile
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Figure 2.2: CDF Plots of Perceived and Measured Annual Education Ex-
penses using All-India and Jharkhand only NSS data for the
Technical track
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Figure 2.3: CDF Plots of Perceived and Measured Annual Education Ex-
penses using All-India and Jharkhand only NSS data for the
General track
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Figure 2.4: CDF Plots of Perceived and Measured Annual Education Ex-
penses using All-India and Jharkhand only NSS data for the Vo-
cational track
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Figure 2.5: Kernel Density of Measured Expenses for Technical Track. Dis-
tribution trimmed at 1st and 99th percentile, value of untrimmed
mean is Rs. 73,158.41
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Figure 2.6: Kernel Density of Measured Expenses for General Track. Distri-
bution trimmed at 1st and 99th percentile, value of untrimmed
mean is Rs. 14,525.24
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Figure 2.7: Kernel Density of Measured Expenses for Vocational Track. Dis-
tribution trimmed at 1st and 99th percentile, value of untrimmed
mean is Rs. 49,057.62
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics of relevant variables from NSS data
Technical General Vocational
National
course fee (Rs.) 45,000 3,605 24,000
books, stationery, uniform (Rs.) 5,000 2,000 4,000
transport (Rs.) 3,500 1,500 2,400
private coaching (Rs.) 10,000 5,000 7,500
other expenses (Rs.) 2,000 500 1,200
total expenses (Rs.) 62,315 10,200 36,200
% receive scholarship 19.97% 19.94% 16.54%
amount scholarship received (Rs.) 18,690 3,438 7,000
total expenses net of scholarship (Rs.) 59,500 9,550 34,000
% private institutes 80.63% 49.05% 69.15%
Jharkhand
course fee (Rs.) 43,800 1,850 34,425
books, stationery, uniform (Rs.) 3,940 1,680 5,550
transport (Rs.) 605 1,440 1,000
private coaching (Rs.) 2,700 3,600 7,200
other expenses (Rs.) 453 450 1,250
total expenses (Rs.) 61,650 8,300 52,985
% receive scholarship 2.27% 5.22% 7.04%
amount scholarship received (Rs.) 14,000 1,200 30,000
total expenses net of scholarship (Rs.) 61,650 8,100 48,575
% private institutes 45.45% 16.54% 71.63%
Notes: (1)Reported expenses are median values for one academic session
of 12 months, and for full time courses. (2) 4.8% (national) and 3.6%
(Jharkhand) of students receive some tuition fee waivers, the course fee
reported is for expenses actually incurred. (3) 6.09% (national) and
3.75% (Jharkhand) of students receive subsidies for textbooks,
the books fee reported refers to actual expenses incurred.
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Table 2.2: Testing for Equality of Perceived & Measured Expenses Distribu-
tions using Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
D-stat 1 P-value (col 1) D-stat 2 P-value (col 3) P-value (comb.)
National
Technical 0.0539 0.002 -0.1707 0.000 0.000
General 0.0011 0.997 -0.588 0.000 0.000
Vocational 0.0142 0.621 -0.2091 0.000 0.000
Jharkhand
Technical 0.0642 0.703 -0.243 0.006 0.008
General 0.0133 0.957 -0.6762 0.000 0.000
Vocational 0.0869 0.141 -0.0819 0.176 0.246
Notes: (1) tests the hypothesis that “perceived” expense distribution contains smaller
values than “measured” expense distribution. (2) tests the hypothesis
that “perceived” expense distribution contains larger values than the “measured”
expense distribution. P-value for the combined hypothesis tests for the max.
of the two directional hypothesis. Obs. in the NSS data for all-India: 4096 (tech.),
5902 (gen.), 5846 (voc.). Obs. in the NSS data for Jharkhand: 44 (tech.),
134 (gen.) & 142 (voc.). Approx. 1500 obs. in Survey dataset for all 3 tracks.
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Table 2.3: Change in Track-wise Affordability (when perceived expenses are
replaced with median of measured expenses)
National Government Private
% of individuals who can afford
each track based on cost perceptions (SE)
Technical 0.18 (0.010) 0.18 (0.010) 0.18 (0.010)
General 0.32 (0.012) 0.32 (0.012) 0.32 (0.012)
Vocational 0.28 (0.012) 0.28 (0.012) 0.28 (0.012)
% of individuals who can afford
each track based on measured costs (SE)
Technical 0.24 (0.011) 0.47 (0.01) 0.20 (0.010)
General 0.83 (0.01) 0.85 (0.009) 0.74 (0.011)
Vocational 0.47 (0.013) 0.70 (0.012) 0.38 (0.012)
Change (95% CI)
Technical 0.06 (0.03-0.09) 0.29 (0.26-0.32) 0.02 (-0.01-0.04)
General 0.52 (0.49-0.55) 0.53 (0.50-0.56) 0.43 (0.40-0.46)
Vocational 0.19 (0.15-0.22) 0.42 (0.38-0.45) 0.10 (0.07-0.13)
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Table 2.4: Parameter estimates of Track-Choice Model
(1) (2)
Linear Mixed Quantile
enjoy coursework 0.0173*** 0.0137***
(0.000903) (0.00134)
pass prob. 0.00596*** 0.00226
(0.00102) (0.00147)
parental approval 0.0125*** 0.0188***
(0.000776) (0.000876)
employment probability 0.00466*** 0.00628***
(0.00104) (0.00125)
log wages 0.0605** 0.0883***
(0.0271) (0.0331)
Constant -0.812 -1.079
(1.290) (1.056)
Observations 4,560 4,560
R-squared 0.230 0.187
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01,
**p<0.05,* p<0.1. Controls for age, sex, caste, religion, college &
stream are added for all regressions.
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Table 2.5: Predicted Enrollment Probabilities & Distribution
of Utility Maximizing Tracks
Predicted Enrollment Probability Utility Max. Tracks
Raw Data Linear Mixed Quantile Raw Data Linear Mixed Quantile
Technical 0.361 0.360 0.373 0.404 0.406 0.410
General 0.325 0.322 0.319 0.322 0.315 0.299
Vocational 0.233 0.285 0.281 0.212 0.274 0.277
Not Enroll 0.081 0.033 0.027 0.062 0.005 0.014
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Table 2.6: Parameters of SES Variables that Explain
Variation in Measured Costs
(1) (2) (3)
Technical General Vocational
Sex
Female -7,474*** -1,211*** -2,901*
Caste
Scheduled Caste -2,352 1,046 5,109
Other Backward Caste 5,571 2,374*** 11,504***
General/Other 15,059*** 3,769*** 18,154***
Religion
Islam -1,234 -628.4 499.1
Christianity 19,559*** 741.8 -1,626
Sikhism -6,047 3,320** 3,586
Jainism -3,817 1,666 -6,004
Buddhism -20,437 -514.8 -1,236
Zoroastrianism 11,705 98,262*** -4,569
Other 29,067 -1,802 13,598
Father’s Education
Primary & below 4,254 166.4 -810.7
Middle -1,525 1,026 2,593
Secondary 3,106 1,898*** 6,435**
Higher Secondary 7,700 870.6 7,654**
Vocational Diploma 11,140 3,290*** 19,501***
Bachelor’s 13,088** 2,265*** 16,027***
Post graduate & above 26,969*** 2,248** 32,613***
Mother’s Education
Primary & below 5,232 -210.1 758.2
Middle 7,144* 678.8 4,288*
Secondary 10,788*** 1,810*** 5,834**
Higher Secondary 11,376** 1,735** 10,412***
Vocational Diploma 27,209*** 6,085*** 21,457***
Bachelor’s 22,082*** 5,458*** 14,690***
Post graduate & above 17,399** 8,622*** 13,648**
Household Occupation
Self-employed in Non-Ag. 1,142 296.4 -1,534
Regular wage/Salaried job 985.9 948.5** 896.9
Casual labor in Ag. -9,851 -1,131 -5,060
Casual labor in Non-Ag. -11,363** -396.8 -6,276**
Constant 49,893*** 7,351*** 16,851***
Observations 3,112 4,261 4,313
Median 59,500 9,550 34,000
Pseudo R2 0.135 0.102 0.105
Note: State of residence is also controlled for, omitted for brevity.
Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01,** p<0.05,*p<0.1.
The base categories are Male, ST, Hinduism, No Formal Schooling
& Self-Employed in Ag.
Table 2.7: Change in Track-wise Affordability
(Median regression used for predicting person-specific
measured costs)
Proportion Standard Error
% of individuals who can afford each
based on cost-perceptions
Technical 0.18 0.011
General 0.32 0.013
Vocational 0.29 0.013
% of individuals who can afford each track
based on measured costs
Technical 0.28 0.013
General 0.87 0.010
Vocational 0.32 0.013
Change 95% CI
Technical 0.10 0.06 0.13
General 0.55 0.51 0.58
Vocational 0.04 0.00 0.07
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Table 2.8: Percentage-Point Change in Affordability of Utility Maximizing
Track
(Median regression used for predicting person-specific measured
costs)
Proportion Standard Error
% of individuals who can afford utility max. track
Based on cost-perceptions 0.33 0.013
Based on measured costs 0.47 0.014
95% CI
Percentage-point change 0.15 0.11 0.18
Break-Down of Change by Track
Technical 0.010
General 0.140
Vocational -0.003
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CHAPTER 3
THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURE IN WOMEN’S NUTRITION:
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM INDIA
3.1 Introduction
Low body-mass index (BMI) among women of childbearing age (15-49 years), indica-
tive of maternal undernutrition, is a grave public health concern because its implica-
tions extend well beyond the individual herself. Maternal undernutrition contributes
to fetal growth restriction, which increases the risk of neonatal deaths and, for sur-
viving children, of stunting (Black et al. (2013)). Indian women are particularly at
risk of being too thin. Adjusting for the characteristics1 of pregnant women, it is es-
timated that approximately 42.2% of pre-pregnant women in India are underweight
(Coffey (2015)). In yet another stark manifestation of the Asian Enigma (Vulimiri,
Urban and Jon (1996)), in Sub-Saharan Africa, only 16.5% of pre-pregnant women
are estimated to be underweight, even though they are much poorer.
Among the reasons advanced for the poor nutritional status of Indian women, an en-
during explanation relates to the intra-household status of women. Several indicators
of womens status in the literature consistently rank women in the countries of South
Asia as lower in comparison to their counterparts in Asia, Africa, Latin America
1In India, fertility is concentrated among women in their early twenties as opposed to Sub-
Saharan Africa where childbearing is more spread out between the ages of 17-35 years. Indian
women in their early twenties are almost 15 pp. more likely to be underweight than 40 year old
women (Coffey (2015)).
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and the Caribbean (Haddad (1999)). The Indian case is particularly unique whereby
features of familial structure and cultural norms that designate inter-personal hierar-
chies foster low social-status among women with perpetuating consequences for her
own and her childs health (Coffey, Khera and Spears (2013)). Worryingly, recent
numbers emerging from the Rapid Survey on Children (RSOC) conducted by the
Union Ministry of Women and Child Development and UNICEF2 show that while
India has seen encouraging progress on metrics of child malnutrition since 2005, the
situation for adolescent girls aged 15-19 years has barely budged with close to 45% of
girls in the age-group having BMI of less than 18.5. With this context in mind, pol-
icy interventions that have the potential to increase the bargaining power of women,
hold particular promise in addressing the problem of maternal malnutrition in the
country.
Recent, academic and policy interest in leveraging the agricultural sector in devel-
oping countries to combat the scourge of malnutrition, is motivated, in part, by the
fact that agriculture is not only a major employer overall in these countries, but is
a major employer of women in particular (Harris, Kadiyala et al. (2012), Pingali,
Ricketts and Sahn (2015), Ruel et al. (2013)). Therefore, one important pathway
by which agriculture is linked to nutrition is by way of being a source of income for
women, which in turn can influence the intra-household allocation of food and other
nutrition-enhancing complements (Hoddinott and Haddad (1995), Bobonis (2009)).
At the same time, heavy agricultural workloads and exposure to toxins and disease
2Rapid Survey on Children (provisional report) by the Ministry of Women and Child Develop-
ment and the UNICEF accessed on 12.12.2015 from http://wcd.nic.in/issnip/National Fact%
20sheet RSOC%20 02-07-2015.pdf.
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through agricultural activities can deleteriously affect women’s health and nutri-
tion and also have negative consequences for lactation and child-care (Jones et al.
(2012),Hoddinott (2012)). Therefore, the net implications of agricultural work for
womens nutrition require empirical investigation. Other pathways by which agricul-
ture and nutrition are posited to be linked include, production for own-consumption
(particularly relevant in the face of high transaction costs and missing markets for
nutritious foods), overall income effects for net-sellers of food and price-effects for
net-buyers (Kadiyala et al. (2014), Carletto et al. (2015)).
In a narrative synthesis of the existing malnutrition literature in India (Pingali and
Rao (2017)), find less than ten papers in peer-reviewed journals that empirically ex-
amine different determinants of women’s nutrition, as measured by anthropometric
outcomes (also see (Kadiyala et al. (2014)) for a related and relevant review). More-
over, all of these studies use cross-sectional data, and most of them do not extensively
control for confounding effects. Therefore, while the potential of the agricultural sec-
tor to address problems of malnutrition is promising, at the household-level, there is
little empirical evidence for whether income growth in agriculture is particularly ben-
eficial for improved nutritional outcomes and in particular, anthropometrics. One
constraint in the Indian context is the availability of anthropometric data, which
is strikingly lacking. Periodic National Family and Health Surveys (NFHS) which
collect nationally representative anthropometric data on children and adults, do not
collect detailed income and agriculture data and, moreover, havent released any unit
data in over a decade3. In this paper, we respond to this gap, by using five years
3The NFHS-4 released aggregated health reports for 13 states in 2015-16. However, the survey
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of household-level panel data, from 18 villages across 5 Indian states, collected by
the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) as
part of the Village Dynamics in South Asia (VDSA) program, to establish the link
between household agricultural income and womens nutritional status, and explore
the pathways by which agricultural incomes may affect nutrition.
Some existing findings, on agricultural output and malnutrition, in the literature pro-
vide context and aid in the interpretation of our results. The effect of agricultural
production on malnutrition at the state-level is inconclusive in the Indian context.
For instance, (Gulati et al. (2012)) find a modest effect of state-level agricultural
production on both child and adult malnutrition metrics but use cross-sectional data
with few controls. On the other hand, (Headey (2013)), finds the effect of state level
agricultural growth on childhood stunting, with state fixed effects, to be particularly
weak for Indian states. In a household fixed-effects study, using Tanzanian data,
(Slavchevska (2015)), establishes a statistically important, positive (inelastic) effect
of household harvest value of crops on height-for-age z-scores of children under 5.
However, the author does not find any effects of the same for adults. Partly, this
could be because, adult underweight is not a substantial problem in their context,
with only about 9 percent of the adult sample being underweight. Using methods
comparable to ours and of (Slavchevska (2015)), (Kirk et al. (2015)) use three years
of data to examine effects of sector-specific incomes in Uganda. They do not find
agricultural incomes to play a crucial role in improving measures of child malnutri-
tion, but caution that their results are heavily context specific to the agricultural
is still in the field for the remaining states and unit data for all states is yet to be released.
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and dietary profile of Uganda.
Some recent studies also throw light on specific pathways by which agriculture may
affect nutrition. For instance, (Hirvonen and Hoddinott (2016)), find that there
is a link between household-level production diversity and diversity of diets among
pre-school children in rural Ethiopia, but it breaks down for households that have
market access to food. The potential of two agricultural pathways, production for
own-consumption (measured by production diversity) and income effects (measured
by agricultural revenue), on household dietary diversity has been looked at in the
Nigerian context (Dillon, McGee and Oseni (2015)). The authors find both pathways
to have statistically significant but relatively inelastic effects on household dietary
diversity. Our findings strengthen the existing literature in multiple ways. Firstly, we
show that there is a statistically significant relationship between household agricul-
tural income and individual nutrition. We do so, both, by utilizing within household,
year to year, variation in household agricultural income and by associating growth
in agricultural income with growth in BMI over the longer term. Here, we con-
tribute to the limited pool of estimates, across countries, which provide a measure
for the agricultural income elasticity of anthropometrics. Further, we establish that
production for self-consumption plays only a limited role in producing nutritional
improvements in our data, but the role of food purchases and hence household in-
come is important. Finally, we establish heterogeneous effects by women’s age and
show significantly higher impact of agricultural income on the nutritional status of
younger women.
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3.2 Data & Summary Statistics
This paper uses five years (2009-2013) of publicly available household and individual
level panel data collected by ICRISAT as part of the VDSA program. The data are
drawn from 18 villages across 5 Indian states Andhra Pradesh/Telangana, Gujarat,
Karnataka, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh. The total number of individuals with
valid BMI data in the sample varies from year to year; and ranges between 791-992
individuals. Rainfall data is from the University of Delaware Air Temperature and
Precipitation database.
Table 3.1 lists the key variables we use in our analysis along with their means and
standard deviations. Anthropometric data is collected annually, at the beginning of
the survey cycle, and income and consumption data are collected monthly, in subse-
quent months. In view of this feature of the survey design, we lag all our explanatory
variable by a year, to predict the following years BMI, our outcome variable of in-
terest. Thus, BMI data used in the study applies to years 2010-20134 and data from
2009-2012 are used for the explanatory variables. This ensures that BMI data in
every year is measured after income and expenditure data for the year. Figure 3.1
plots the cross-sectional distribution of the BMI of sample women5. Among all
4Anthropometric data collection in VDSA villages, from the five states, started in 2010.
5BMI data that is likely measurement error is excluded from the analysis. For all individuals
having BMI less than 11 and greater than 40, and for individuals with individual-level BMI devia-
tions smaller than the 1st percentile and larger than the 99th percentile, we consider observations of
the individual for all years, on a case-by-case basis, to classify the BMI observation as measurement
error or not. This is done, primarily, based on consistency of height values recorded in other years
for the individual. In all, only 0.42% of all BMI observations are excluded on account of being
measurement error.
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women of child-bearing age, between 15-49 years, 33% of women are underweight
with BMI<18.5. This number is worryingly high, and shows little progress since the
DHS national average of 35% underweight women in 2005. Moreover, the incidence
of underweight for younger women (15-25 y), among whom fertility is primarily con-
centrated, is higher by more than 13 percentage points, with the BMI distribution
for this age-group having a larger mass of observations in the low BMI ranges. Fig-
ure 3.2 plots the distribution of the deviations of women’s year-specific BMI from
their mean BMI. As is to be expected, within-individual variation in BMI, which
we will be utilizing for our panel data analysis, is more limited, but nevertheless
sufficient to yield meaningful insights. The average yearly deviation from individual-
specific BMI means is 0.65 points and for 95 percent of the women in our sample
BMI varies within a band of +/- 2 BMI points. Even though we explicitly check for
and exclude BMI observations that are undoubtedly measurement-error (primarily
based on older individuals for whom a lower height was recorded in a subsequent
year), there are some still observations with large absolute deviations in BMI, owing
to wide fluctuations in the weight of the individual over the span of four-years. We
examine how our results are affected by the presence of such outlier individuals in
subsequent analysis.
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3.3 Empirical Specification
We set-up our econometric framework to (a) quantify the effect of agricultural income
on womens BMI over the short-term by modelling year-wise deviations in BMI from
person-specific means as a function of deviations in household agricultural income;
(b) estimate the growth in womens BMI, over a span of four years, as a function of
the growth in her households agricultural income. The growth specification averages
out positive and negative yearly fluctuations in income and helps to estimate the
cumulative effect of income from agriculture, over time. We examine the effect of
agricultural income on individual nutritional status over the short-term (one year)
using the regression specification in (Equation 3.1):
BMIihvt = αihvt + β1f(GV Ahvt) + β2Ahvt + β3Phvt + β4Xhvt + γih + εihvt (3.1)
As an indicator of individual nutritional status, we are interested in the BMI of
women of child-bearing age, which is measured as a continuous variable. As our
measure of agricultural income, we are interested in the effect of “Gross Value Added
(GVA)” per acre which is measured, at the household level, in monetary terms using
household-level sale prices of crop output. The function f(.) is an inverse hyperbolic
sine (IHS), a transformation which works akin to a log transformation in terms
of reducing the weight attached to extreme observations, but is defined for zero-
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valued observations (Burbidge, Magee and Robb (1988))6. Ahvt is total area in acres
cultivated by a household in year t, an important control-variable which intends to
capture productivity differentials on account of land-size (Barrett (1996)) which also
likely correlate with nutritional differences across households and within individuals
over time. We model participation in agriculture in a given year by including a
participation dummy with Phvt = 0 if GV Ahvt = 0 and Phvt = 1 if GV Ahvt > 0. αihvt
is the constant and εihvt is the mean zero error term.
The inclusion of individual level fixed effects (γih) differences out time-invariant
individual-level factors which could potentially confound the effect of GV Ahvt on
BMIihvt. Identification of the effect of GV Ahvt on BMIihvt rests on the identify-
ing assumption that time variant heterogeneity between individuals does not bias
β1 on account of inducing correlation between GV Ahvt and εihvt. Given our data,
this assumption is not directly verifiable. Next best, we sequentially control for the
most likely time-variant factors that could potentially account for the apparent rela-
tionship between GV Ahvt and BMIihvt and do not find them to substantially alter
our relationship of interest. In a separate specification (Equation 3.2), described
below, we also estimate the long term growth (over four years) of women’s BMI as a
function of the growth of her household’s agricultural income, controlling for growth
in other relevant dimensions, and find statistical support for our hypothesis. This
specification, which averages out year-to-year fluctuations in BMI and GVA, is less
likely to be susceptible to unobserved year-specific shocks. Taken together, both sets
6Nevertheless, results are nearly identical when the transformation g(GV A) = ln(GV A + 1) is
used, and are available upon request.
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of results lend credibility to our identifying assumption.
We estimate the effect of agricultural income growth on BMI growth, over the long
term as per the time-period of this study using:
gBMIihv = αihv + β1g
GV A
hv + β2g
A
hv + β3g
X
hv + εihv (3.2)
Where, gBMIihv is the growth rate of women-specific BMI, g
GV A
hv is growth rate of
household GVA/acre, gAhv is the growth rate of cultivated area and g
X
hv is the growth
rate of control variables. The growth rate of each included variable (measured at
either the individual or household level) is calculated by estimating (Equation 3.3)
for every individual in the sample and capturing the coefficient on year (t)7:
ln(Yih) = ln(αih) + giht+ ln(εih) (3.3)
Included time-variant controls (Xihvt) in (Equation 3.1) and g
X
hv in (Equation 3.2) in-
clude changes in family size, changing access to amenities critical to both agricultural
income and nutrition (household level access to electricity and piped water/water
from a drinking water well), non-agricultural sources of household income, house-
7Equation (3.3) results from taking logs of the non-linear “exponential growth” equation Y =
α(e)gtε. Notice that this specification also implicitly accounts for an individual fixed-effect (for
variables measured at the individual level) and household fixed-effect (for household level variables).
Say, c denotes a fixed effect, and Y = α(e)gtεc. Taking logs on both sides drops out the fixed effect
(a dummy variable taking value of 1 for the relevant household) and we are back to estimating
(3.3).
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hold medical expenditure and village-level rainfall. One of the major strengths of
the ICRISAT data are the detailed manner in which household income is tracked- not
based on recall as is typical in surveys of this kind, but through monthly visitations to
households. We include four major categories of non-agricultural income as controls-
livestock income, income from non-agriculture, unearned income and income from
agriculture labor8. In the absence of detailed health data, household medical ex-
penditure is used as a proxy for year-specific health shocks which could both effect
agricultural income through the capacity to work on farm and directly affect BMI.
Village-level rainfall, undoubtedly affects agricultural productivity and also likely
affects nutrition outcomes via altering the individuals disease environment9.
Finally, to account for unobserved aggregate shocks, we cluster our standard errors
8Income from non-agriculture includes income from salaried jobs, income from caste occupations,
business income, other non-farm income and income from non-farm migratory work. Unearned
income includes gifts and remittances, savings and deposits and rental income. Agricultural labor
income includes income from both working in the village labor market and migratory labor income.
9A different strategy to address concerns of correlation between GV Ahvt and εihvt would be to
instrument GV Ahvt with a variable correlated with agricultural income but not with individual
nutrition. However, our dataset does not offer suitable instruments to pursue this strategy. Both
soil quality and irrigation, instruments suggested in the literature (Slavchevska (2015)) to address
endogeneity concerns, lack within individual variation over time, necessary for identification in
our model. For instance, the median yearly deviation of “cultivated area under irrigation”, from
individual-specific means is 0. Another identification concern relevant in this context is one of
reverse causality. This is the idea that better nourished individuals may be able to apply their
labor more intensively in the agricultural production process and may hence enjoy higher output.
Even though, clearly, BMI in our data is recorded after data on agricultural output for a year
was collected, temporal persistence in BMI data could potentially invalidate our results. To check
whether this is a concern in our context, we include lagged BMI (by a year) in our final specification
as an explanatory variable. The inclusion of lagged BMI, has no effect on the estimated effect size
of GV Ahvt, in fact the effect is somewhat strengthened. However, by including lagged BMI we
lose close to 40 percent of our observations, which nearly doubles our standard errors, making
our inference imprecise. Since anthropometric data collection started only in 2010, by including
in lagged BMI, we lose all of our 2010 observations (BMI missing for 2009) and some additional
observations for which BMI in the previous year was missing. These results have been omitted for
brevity but are available upon request.
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at the village level. Because we have a small number of villages (n=18), we boot-
strap standard errors on our coefficients of interest using Wild cluster bootstrapping
(Cameron and Miller (2015)). This addresses concerns that with a small number of
clusters standard asymptotic theory cannot be used to make inference and the use of
standard distributional assumptions yield confidence intervals that are “too narrow”.
To address concerns regarding serially correlated errors, we also alternatively clus-
ter at the individual level, but in most cases these standard errors are smaller and
therefore have been omitted for the sake of brevity, but are available upon request.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Do Agricultural Incomes Impact Womens Nutritional
Status?
The extent to which the agricultural sector can influence individuals’ nutritional
status, is a function of the size of the sector and its economic importance at the
household-level. In the context of diversifying rural economic activity and the grow-
ing importance of the rural non-farm sector, the role of agriculture in poverty reduc-
tion and nutritional improvements, is not immediately obvious and requires detailed
consideration. In Figure 3.3 we look at the sectoral composition of household in-
comes, to investigate the relative economic significance of farming activity. Income
from farming (i.e. crop income) is the largest source of income for households in
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our sample and, on average, accounts for around a third of all income. In com-
parison, the share of earned non-agricultural income, while on an upward trend, is
still small, relative to farming. The “unearned income category comprises of rental
income (including rent from land), income from gifts and remittances and savings
and deposits.
Thus, the break-down of the sectoral composition of household incomes posits an
important role of crop incomes as a source of income for purchases and production of
food for self-consumption. We also find descriptive evidence to support that the rela-
tive efficacy of crop incomes versus non-agricultural incomes, in improving nutrition,
could be operating via the gender pathway. Across both the non-agricultural sector
and farming, a majority of income earned accrues to males. However, as can be seen
in Figure 3.4, the proportion of income accruing to women, is nearly two times as
large in farming as it is in non-agriculture. To the extent that women spend more
time working in farming than in non-agriculture, increases in agricultural output can
plausibly afford women control over a larger share of household economic production
and hence greater bargaining power over the allocation of household resources.
Table 3.2 presents results, from our baseline specification (without secondary con-
trols), of the effect of agricultural income on womens BMI. For single crop estimates,
“yield” (i.e. quantity of output per acre) is often used as a simple measure of out-
put. GVA is a comparable measure, except it is in monetary terms and allows us to
aggregate across crops. Aggregation across crops is necessary in our sample because
of the wide variety of crops that households grow. Column (1) includes village fixed
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effects and column (2) includes individual fixed effects. Therefore, in column (1), we
compare women’s BMI across households with differing agricultural incomes, within
village and year. These estimates utilize cross-sectional variation across households
and compared to the estimates in column (2) are demonstrably biased upwards. In
column (2), we estimate individual-level deviations in BMI (from their person-specific
means) as a function of year-wise deviations in household GVA/acre and, hence, uti-
lize within-individual variation in estimating the effect of agricultural incomes. These
estimates are not confounded by observed and unobserved time-invariant differences
between individuals that weaken the validity of cross-sectional estimates.
In Figure 3.2 we see some individuals with very large BMI changes (<-4/>+4)
over the time-period under consideration. Heights for these individuals were in-
deed recorded consistently, and large BMI changes are purely attributable to large
changes in weight, a metric for which it is considerably harder to discern between
actual changes versus measurement error. In column (3), we explore how sensitive
our estimates are to the exclusion of outliers. In particular, we exclude 15 smallest
and 15 largest individual-level BMI deviations to find that the point estimate on
GVA/acre reduces somewhat. The results however become more precise. In a subse-
quent section, we analyze the implications of our findings for the range of effect-sizes
implied by our treatment of outlier observations. In Table 3.2 and in subsequent ta-
bles, for robustness, we present results first with no outliers dropped and next with
15 smallest and 15 largest observations dropped10.
10To justify why we exclude 15 smallest and 15 largest observations, in Table 3.3 we report how
the effect-size changes when 5, 10 and 15 smallest and largest observations are dropped from the
sample. Dropping the 5 smallest and 5 largest observations has the largest impact on our estimate
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Cross-sectional/within village estimates are presented in Table 3.4 for comparison
with subsequent results that include individual fixed effects (Table 3.5). From the
cross-sectional results in Table 3.4 it is apparent that once we account for other
differences between households and individuals by including relevant controls, no
independent statistically significant effect of agricultural income on BMI can be es-
tablished. Table 3.5 presents results from the short term specification (Equation 1)
and sequentially adds in household-level controls (col. 1), village-level rainfall (col.
2), removes BMI outliers (col. 3), and presents a final set of results with the full set
of controls and without outliers (col. 4). Here, once we account for individual fixed
effects, the effect of agricultural income on women’s BMI is robust to the inclusion
of household level controls shown in column (1). This points to the importance of
household and individual level panel data in establishing the result on the effect of
agricultural income on nutritional status. In column (2), we control for village-level
annual rainfall, which only somewhat moderates the effect of GVA/acre on BMI.
Dropping the 15 smallest and 15 largest BMI changes, results in a somewhat smaller
but more precise effect-size (columns 3 & 4).
The sign of the coefficient on household level access to electricity in columns (3,4)
is not in line with intuition. However, given high average levels of electrification
in the sample villages (93-96 percent in 2010-2013), it is possible that households
electrified during the time-period in our study, that is households electrified last,
of GVA/acre (point estimate drops by around 19 percent), but dropping subsequent observations
have a much smaller impact on our point estimate of interest. Moreover, after dropping 15 smallest
and 15 largest observations, the next 5 observations on either tail range from 10-14 kilos of weight
change over the time period in our sample, which are plausible weight changes, especially considering
that given that our panel is not a balanced one.
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were the worst off households where no year-on-year improvements in maternal BMI
were seen. Nevertheless, as a first order concern, electricity at the household level
is not correlated with household agricultural output, which is re-assuring. Notice,
that in all specifications the sign on the coefficient on the indicator for agricultural
sector participation is consistently negative. Therefore, households that farm have,
on average, lower BMI than households that do not, which could partly indicate
high energy expenditure on account of agricultural work. Thus, the positive sign
on agricultural income is conditional on agricultural-sector participation, with 77
percent of the sample households participating in the sector.
One concern may be that the income variables included are not statistically signif-
icant and hence may not be serving as effective controls on account of being insuf-
ficiently correlated with BMI. In Table 3.6, we re-estimate Table 3.5 with the four
non-agricultural income variables being included as quartiles. As can be seen, higher
quartiles of non-agricultural income, unearned income and agricultural labor income
are indeed significantly correlated with better BMI outcomes. However, accounting
for these controls does not substantially alter the effect of GVA/acre.
The linear-log relationship between BMI and household agricultural income, as mod-
eled in Equation 1 implies a 10 percent increase in GVA/acre is associated with a
BMI increase of 0.0088-0.0117 points, which is a 0.04-0.06 percent increase relative
to mean BMI. To further give a sense of the economic implication of our results,
we use the parameter-estimate obtained on the GVA/acre coefficient from different
specifications of our individual fixed-effects model, to compare predicted BMI at
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specific levels of agricultural income. Using the parameter estimates from Table 3.5,
column (2), we find that the difference in predicted BMI between households with no
crop income and households at the median level of agricultural income is 1.05 BMI
points. Relatedly, predicted BMI increases by 0.29 points when individuals between
the 25th and the 75th percentile of the GVA/acre distribution are compared, with all
other variables in the concerned regression, being held at their mean values. When
parameter estimates from columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.5 are used, we find that
predicted BMI increases by 0.27 and 0.24 points respectively, when individuals be-
tween the 25th and the 75th percentile of the GVA/acre distribution are compared.
The difference in GVA/acre in rupee terms between those at the 75th percentile
of the transformed GVA/acre distribution and those at the 25th percentile, is of
roughly 16,500 rupees (roughly 250 U.S. dollars or 833 PPP dollars11) per acre per
year. Averaged output prices across space and time imply that the GVA/acre rupee
difference translates into yields of 0.57 tons/acre (pigeon pea) and 1.25 tons/acre
(wheat).
Table 3.7 presents results from the long term growth specification in Equation 3.2.
Column (1) includes zero valued year-by-household GVA/acre observations, and
these results imply that a 10 pp. increase in the growth rate of GVA/acre is associ-
ated a 0.04 pp. increase in the growth rate of BMI. Column (2) excludes zero-valued
year-by-household GVA/acre observations. Around 90% of the excluded observa-
tions in column (2) are on account of households that dont farm in all four years or
11The PPP conversion factor used in based on the 2011 International Comparison Program
(ICP) round accessed on the World Bank website at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
PA.NUS.PPPC.RF on 4.4.2016.
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in three out of four years. The effect of GVA/acre on BMI is stronger among these
households, with a 10 pp. increase in GVA/acre growth rate being associated with a
0.15 pp. increase in BMI growth rate. The negative association between the growth
rate of livestock income and the growth rate of BMI is possibly indicative of the well
documented association between animal husbandry and human diarrhea and enteric
infections (Zambrano et al. (2014)). The growth rate of none of the other sources of
non-agricultural income is statistically associated with the growth rate of BMI.
In Table 3.8, we examine the effect of GVA/acre on women’s BMI, broken down
by the age-category of the woman. Across all three specifications, the impact of
agricultural income on BMI is larger for younger women in the age-group 15-25
years, as compared to women in the older age group 25-49 years. The former effect
is also estimated very precisely. Therefore, the impact of agricultural income is
stronger for women who are, on average, significantly more likely to be underweight
(recall the age-wise distributions presented in Figure 3.1(B)). A plausible explanation
for the salient age-effect apparent in our results is that the diets of younger, more
underweight women are more responsive to agriculture-income increases. This is
especially true if people have a set point for their weight and stop eating when it
is reached. For people at their set point, an increase in GVA should not lead to
an increase in their BMI. Apart from diets, households may also respond to higher
agricultural production by changing the intra-household allocation of labor force
participation and diverting labor away from younger household members.
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3.4.2 Empirical Insights on Agriculture-Nutrition Pathways
Next, we empirically test for the importance of home production for self-consumption,
for nutrition. Under the non-separability of production and consumption decisions
(Singh, Squire and Strauss (1986)), which arise in the presence of high market-
transaction costs, we might find home production of food to have a significant effect
on nutrition.
In Table 3.9, we formally test for whether production for own consumption is a
possible pathway by which agricultural incomes might impact women’s BMI. In an
analogous regression, we examine the effects of food purchases, the results of which
are presented in Table 3.10. We expect the two regressions to be symmetric, be-
cause own production and purchases together form well over 90% of the sourced by
households (Figure 3.6)12. In both Table 3.9 and Table 3.10, we focus on the re-
sults in columns (2) and (3), as our preferred set of results. Here, we test for the
effect of the source of food procurement, by accounting for the ratio of expenditure
on a food group from a certain source as a ratio of total expenditure on that food
group, controlling for overall expenditure shares of included food-groups, total food
expenditure and the full set of time-variant controls from Table 3.5, col. 2. Col. 1
of both tables presents cross-sectional results with village fixed-effects for the sake
of comparison and the specification in column (3) tests robustness to the exclusion
of outlier values.
12Figure 3.5 shows overall expenditure shares for the different food groups among the sample
households
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We do not find production for own consumption to be an important pathway by
which agricultural income affects nutrition. Only for cereals is the effect of own
production marginally significant. On the other hand, we see in Table 3.10 that the
purchase of pulses have a strong and statistically significant effect on women’s BMI,
though this effect is somewhat imprecisely measured when outliers are removed (col.
3). The market seems to be playing an important role in facilitating the consumption
of protein rich and nutritious pulses. Nutritional improvements on account of market
purchases of pulses among agricultural households, indicate an income effect. While
we do see that very large changes in non-agricultural income sources (yearly jump
from the first to the fourth quartile) do correlate with BMI improvements, the short-
term and long-term specifications (Table 3.5 & Table 3.7) taken together, suggest a
dominant association of agricultural income and BMI.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
Agricultural productivity growth has long been seen as a promising pathway to-
wards reducing malnutrition, given it’s high incidence among predominantly culti-
vator families in rural India. Our results encourage pursuing an agricultural growth
strategy for addressing nutritional concerns, with a specific focus on womens mal-
nutrition. Moreover, our results suggest exceptionally stronger effects for younger
women, a demographic most at risk of being underweight, and among whom fertility
is largely concentrated. Among pathways considered, we find own-production to be
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only weakly associated with BMI increases but individual nutrition benefits from
market purchases, especially of protein-rich pulses, to a larger extent. Given the
relative strength of rural markets in India, as compared to countries in sub-Saharan
Africa, we provide an important context to evaluate the income-nutrition pathway via
market access to food. That increasing agricultural incomes also empowers women
within households to allocate expenses towards more nutritious purchases is a hy-
pothesis that requires more detailed consideration, but is consistent with the patterns
in our data. While our results recommend a role for agricultural income increases
to influence nutrition outcomes among the group of households that cultivate, they
also show a trade-off between participation in own farm labor and nutritional gains.
Therefore, investment in labor-saving agricultural technologies can have significant
positive benefits in terms of improved personal health and nutrition.
Lastly, we also find a strong cross-sectional relationship between women’s BMI and
that of her children, as measured by weight-for-height z-scores of children under 5
(Table 3.11). Controlling for a set of village, household, mother and child level vari-
ables, mother’s BMI is a very strong predictor of her child’s weight-for-height z-score
(p-value=0.005). This effect exists net of differences in household socio-economics,
and suggests a more direct link between maternal health and empowerment with
child weight. This effect is likely operational through multiple channels including,
nutritionally, through breast-feeding, or more generally via mothers caring capacity.
This result, in conjunction with recent literature examining the effect of womens
empowerment on child nutrition (Coffey, Khera and Spears (2013)), (Imai et al.
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(2014)), suggest, additionally, strong inter-generational nutritional benefits of agri-
cultural productivity increases.
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Figures & Tables for Chapter 3
Figure 3.1: BMI Distribution of Sample Women (A), and BMI distribution
by Age (B)
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Yearly Deviations from Woman-Specific BMI
Means
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Figure 3.3: Sectoral Composition of Household Incomes from Different
Sources, by Year
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Figure 3.4: Proportion of Income Accruing to Women and Men from Non-
Ag. Sector & Farming
164
Figure 3.5: Household-Level Food Group Expenditure Share by Year
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Figure 3.6: Sources of Food Procurement by Year (A), and
Food Group (B)
166
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables used in Statistical Anal-
ysis
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
BMI - - 20.44 3.71 20.47 3.75 20.45 3.64 20.7 3.67
Age (in years) 29.9 9.87 30.54 10.03 30.5 9.85 30.46 9.91 30.71 10.06
Education (in years) 5.71 4.96 5.71 4.95 5.96 4.96 6.23 5.01 6.37 5
Household Size (no. of people) 6.12 2.84 5.95 2.8 5.96 2.8 6 2.83 6.12 2.92
GVA/acre (’000 rupees) 13.33 38.9 13.79 15.38 13.37 19.96 13.86 14.24 16.19 17.29
Cultivated Area (in acres) 5.6 8.91 5.82 9.02 6.42 11.17 6.14 10.65 6.45 11
% HHs in Farming 0.76 0.42 0.76 0.42 0.78 0.42 0.78 0.42 0.81 0.4
Farm Income (’000 rupees) 88.19 201.79 94.17 161.08 86.08 147.68 96.38 170.44 110.51 208.42
Livestock Income (’000 rupees) 31.54 42 34.26 43.77 39.25 53.93 46.1 61.51 39.22 57.18
Non-Ag. Income (’000 rupees) 24.2 57.58 30.7 65.18 37.43 71.4 39.78 71.74 38.9 67.89
Unearned Income (’000 rupees) 33.28 86.93 48.36 236.86 39.37 94.14 38.6 80.23 34.74 86.66
Ag. Labor Income (’000 rupees) 11.74 16.22 13.68 17.86 14.26 20.71 12.69 18.12 12.06 16.97
Total HH Income (’000 rupees) 189 263.23 221.52 343.33 216.8 227.36 233.91 237.41 235.64 274.45
Medical Expenditure (’000 rupees) 4.84 11.38 5.15 14.07 4.4 8.79 5.29 11.08 4.96 10.21
HH Food Expenditure (’000 rupees) 35.63 17.59 35.38 17.54 37.47 19.36 37.51 19.5 38.37 20.74
Cereal Share in Food Expenditure 0.25 0.08 0.22 0.06 0.22 0.07 0.22 0.08 0.2 0.08
% HHs with electricity 0.88 0.33 0.93 0.26 0.94 0.24 0.96 0.21 0.96 0.19
% HHs with water 0.52 0.5 0.51 0.5 0.53 0.5 0.53 0.5 0.56 0.5
% HHs with toilets 0.25 0.43 0.28 0.45 0.35 0.48 0.37 0.48 0.42 0.49
Village rainfall (cm/year) 78.76 17.27 100.3 21.82 74.58 26.16 61.11 25.18 90.81 29.49
Notes: (1) All income & expenditure variables are in real terms, expressed in 2009-10 rupees.
(2) “GVA/acre” refers to Gross Value Added/Acre
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Table 3.2: Relationship between Agricultural Income
& Women’s BMI (Baseline Specification)
Independent Variable Dependent Variable-BMI
(1) (2) (3)
GVA/acre 0.203*/+ 0.112* 0.091**/*
(Cluster-Robust p-Value) (0.075) (0.062) (0.046)
(Wild Bootstrap p-Value) (0.108) (0.074) (0.058)
Cultivated Area 0.0387** 0.00303 0.00447
Ag. Sector Participation -2.105* -0.951* -0.758*
Age 0.240*** - -
Age Squared -0.00204* - -
Constant 14.90*** 20.03*** 20.06***
Year FE YES YES YES
Village FE YES YES YES
Individual FE NO YES YES
Extreme BMI Deviations Removed NO NO YES
Observations 3,569 3,325 3,294
Notes: (1) Standard errors are clustered at the village level
(2) Variable for “GVA/acre” has been transformed using an
inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. “Cultivated Area” is in acres,
Ag. Sector Participation is a dummy variable for whether or not
a household farms. (3) Age and Age-Squared are important
predictors of women’s BMI and are included in all cross-sectional/village
fixed-effects specifications. Age variables are omitted from the
panel/individual fixed-effects specifications because of
the inclusion of year fixed-effects. (4)*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1,
+ p<0.15
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Table 3.3: Changes in Effect-Size of GVA/acre due to Removal of Outliers
Independent Variable Dependent Variable-BMI
None 5 smallest & 10 smallest & 15 smallest &
5 largest 10 largest 15 largest
GVA/acre 0.112* 0.0984* 0.0914* 0.091**/*
(Cluster-Robust p-Value) (0.062) (0.063) (0.064) (0.046)
(Wild Bootstrap p-Value) (0.074) (0.086) (0.080) (0.058)
Cultivated Area 0.00303 0.00675 0.0047 0.00447
Ag. Sector Participation -0.951* -0.804 -0.715 -0.758*
Constant 20.03*** 20.01*** 20.02*** 20.06***
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Village FE YES YES YES YES
Individual FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 3,325 3,314 3,305 3,294
Notes: (1) Standard errors are clustered at the village level
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1., + p<0.15
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Table 3.4: Relationship between Agricultural Productivity and
Women’s BMI (Pooled Cross-Section Results)
Independent Variable Dependent Variable-BMI
(1) (2) (3)
GVA/acre 0.151 0.0996 0.0942
(Cluster-Robust p-Value) (0.191) (0.374) (0.406)
Cultivated Area 0.0299* 0.0244* 0.0242*
Ag. Sector Participation -1.624 -1.027 -0.97
Own Education 0.0785*** 0.0522** 0.0525**
Family Size -0.0087 -0.028 -0.0281
HH has Electricity 0.378 0.252 0.267
HH has Water 0.443 0.351 0.34
Livestock Income - -0.00387 -0.0031
Non- Ag. Income - 0.0297 0.0306
Unearned Income - 0.0609** 0.0600**
Ag. Labor Income - -0.0626*** -0.0614***
Medical Expenditure - 0.0829** 0.0861**
Age 0.266*** 0.255*** 0.256***
Age Squared -0.00215* -0.00211* -0.00211*
Constant 13.39*** 13.20** -0.00235**
Year FE YES YES YES
Village FE YES YES YES
Village Rainfall NO NO 0.00656*
Observations 3,568 3,565 3,565
Notes:(1) Standard errors are clustered at the village level
(2)“GVA/acre”, all income variables and the medical expenditure
variable have been transformed using an inverse hyperbolic sine
transformation. (3) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p¡0.15
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Table 3.5: Relationship between Agricultural Income and Women’s BMI
with Sequential Addition of Controls (Panel-Data Results)
Independent Variables Dependent Variable-BMI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GVA/acre 0.117** 0.106* 0.0982** 0.0880**
(Cluster-Robust p-Value) (0.049) (0.065) (0.033) (0.037)
(Wild Bootstrap p-Value) (0.054) (0.066) (0.036) (0.032)
Cultivated Area 0.00536 0.00186 0.00694 0.00381
Ag. Sector Participation -0.997* -0.893 -0.820* -0.725*
Family Size -0.015 -0.0169 -0.0205 -0.0221
HH has Electricity -0.177 -0.156 -0.210** -0.190*
HH has Water 0.0662 0.0467 -0.00658 -0.0243
Livestock Income -0.00605 -0.00594 -0.00239 -0.00232
Non- Ag. Income 0.000296 0.00212 0.00808 0.0098
Unearned Income 0.023 0.0218 0.0122 0.0112
Ag. Labor Income 0.00974 0.0121 0.00917 0.0114
Medical Expenditure 0.0149 0.0166 0.0145 0.016
Constant 19.91*** 19.57*** 20.05*** 19.90***
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Individual FE YES YES YES YES
Village Rainfall NO 0.00428 NO 0.00392*
Extreme BMI Deviations Removed NO NO YES YES
Observations 3,325 3,325 3,294 3,294
Notes: (1) Standard errors are clustered at the village level
(2) “GVA/acre”, all income variables and the medical expenditure variable
have been transformed using an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation
(3) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1., + p<0.15
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Table 3.6: Relationship between Agricultural Productivity and Women’s
BMI with Income Quartiles as Controls
Independent Variable Dependent Variable-BMI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GVA/acre 0.116* 0.104* 0.0918** 0.0799**
(Cluster-Robust p-Value) (0.058) (0.076) (0.037) (0.045)
(Wild Bootstrap p-Value) (0.068) (0.088) (0.040) (0.040)
Cultivated Area 0.00423 0.00048 0.00682 0.00369
Ag. Sector Participation -0.985* -0.867 -0.759* -0.649*
Family Size -0.0205 -0.0234 -0.033 -0.0356
HH has Electricity -0.153 -0.131 -0.196* -0.174
HH has Water 0.0467 0.0266 -0.024 -0.0425
2nd Quartile Non-Ag. Income -0.0336 -0.0218 -0.0599 -0.0494
3rd Quartile Non- Ag. Income -0.084 -0.0637 0.0297 0.0484
4th Quartile Non- Ag. Income 0.086 0.116 0.223* 0.251*
2nd Quartile Livestock Income -0.0675 -0.0569 -0.00393 0.00567
3rd Quartile Livestock Income -0.0233 -0.0361 0.0346 0.0219
4th Quartile Livestock Income -0.0859 -0.11 -0.0539 -0.0768
2nd Quartile Unearned Income 0.104 0.117 0.0177 0.0288
3rd Quartile Unearned Income -0.00152 0.00384 -0.0408 -0.0359
4th Quartile Unearned Income 0.169* 0.187** 0.139 0.156*
2nd Quartile Ag. Labor Income 0.0495 0.0759 0.000158 0.0241
3rd Quartile Ag. Labor Income 0.13 0.15 0.111 0.13
4th Quartile Ag. Labor Income 0.0743 0.109 0.206* 0.239**
Medical Expenditure 0.0165 0.0176 0.0165 0.0174
Constant 20.04*** 19.67*** 20.157*** 19.81***
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Individual FE YES YES YES YES
Village Rainfall NO 0.00467* NO 0.00430**
Extreme BMI Deviations Removed NO NO YES YES
Observations 3,325 3,325 3,294 3,294
Notes:(1) Standard errors are clustered at the village level
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15
172
Table 3.7: Relationship between Agricultural Income Growth and BMI
growth
Independent Variables Dependent Variable-Growth Rate of BMI
(1) (2)
At least 2 years of At least 2 years of
GVA/acre ≥ 0 GVA/acre > 0
Growth rate of GVA/acre 0.00362*** 0.0153***
(Cluster-Robust p-Value) (0.007) (0.001)
(Wild Bootstrap p-Value) (0.006) (0.000)
Growth rate of Cult. Area -0.000347 0.000103
Growth rate of Family Size 0.00311 0.0161
Growth rate of Water Access -0.0147 -0.0062
Growth rate of Elec. Access 0.00392 0.0119
Growth rate of Non. Ag Income -0.000793 -0.0004
Growth rate of Unearned Income 0.00033 0.000508
Growth rate of Livestock Income -0.00293*** -0.00330**
Growth rate of Ag. Labor Income 0.000224 -0.000273
Growth rate of Medical Expenditure -0.00138 -0.00166
Growth rate of Rainfall 0.0246 0.0205
Constant 0.0175*** 0.0156***
Observations 1045 827
Notes: (1) Standard errors are clustered at the village level
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.8: Relationship between Agricultural Income and
Women’s BMI- by Age
Independent Variable Dependent Variable-BMI
(1) (2) (3)
Younger#GVA/Acre 0.150** 0.137** 0.119***/**
(Cluster-Robust p-Value) (0.016) (0.019) (0.009)
(Wild Bootstrap p-Value) (0.026) (0.026) (0.018)
Older#GVA/Acre 0.109* 0.0978+ 0.0787*
(Cluster-Robust p-Value) (0.079) (0.11) (0.078)
(Wild Bootstrap p-Value) (0.088) (0.106) (0.088)
Age Group 0.163 0.183 0.0539
Cultivated Area 0.00565 0.00219 0.00423
Ag. Sector Participation -0.986* -0.881 -0.705*
Family Size -0.005 -0.00692 -0.0144
HH has Electricity -0.182 -0.161 -0.194*
HH has Water 0.0723 0.0529 -0.0184
Livestock Income -0.00589 -0.00579 -0.0022
Non- Ag. Income -0.00015 0.00166 0.00941
Unearned Income 0.0226 0.0214 0.0108
Ag. Labor Income 0.00992 0.0123 0.0115
Medical Expenditure 0.0144 0.0161 0.0155
Constant 19.74*** 19.39*** 19.62***
Year FE YES YES YES
Individual FE YES YES YES
Village Rainfall NO 0.00425 0.00389*
Extreme BMI Deviations Removed NO NO YES
Observations 3,325 3,325 3,294
Notes:(1) Standard errors are clustered at the village level
(2) Age Group=0 if 25< age ≤ 49 and Age Group=1 if 15≤ age ≤25
(3) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p< 0.15
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Table 3.9: Own Production of Different Food Groups and Women’s BMI
Independent Variables Dependent Variable-BMI
(1) (2) (3)
Own prod. ratio-cereals -0.0789 0.181+ 0.173+
(Cluster-Robust p-Value) (0.800) (0.117) (0.108)
(Wild Bootstrap p-Value) (0.795) (0.164) (0.148)
Own prod. ratio-fruits & veg. 0.997 0.272 0.451
(Cluster-Robust p-Value) (0.296) (0.686) (0.401)
(Wild Bootstrap p-Value) (0.342) (0.848) (0.611)
Own prod. ratio-milk -0.429 0.0824 -0.0249
(Cluster-Robust p-Value) (0.229) (0.680) (0.859)
(Wild Bootstrap p-Value) -0.226 (0.696) (0.861)
Own prod. ratio-other foods 10.46*** -0.0376 0.112
(Cluster-Robust p-Value) (0.000) (0.996) (0.883)
(Wild Bootstrap p-Value) -0.004 (0.920) (0.925)
Own prod. ratio-pulses -0.452 -0.332+ -0.218
(Cluster-Robust p-Value) (0.227) (0.106) (0.212)
(Wild Bootstrap p-Value) (0.254) (0.134) (0.238)
Overall expenditure share- cereals -1.254 1.569 0.558
Overall expenditure share- fruits & veg. 0.0479 -0.225 -0.982
Overall expenditure share- milk 2.933 2.683 1.138
Overall expenditure share- other foods -1.36 0.302 -1.045
Overall expenditure share- pulses -0.534 1.629 1.373
Total food expenditure 0.914** -0.176 -0.1
Age 0.248*** - -
Age Squared -0.00213* - -
Constant 5.227 20.41*** 20.51***
Year FE YES YES YES
Village FE YES YES YES
Individual FE NO YES YES
Extreme BMI Deviations Removed NO NO YES
Time Variant Controls (from Table 3.5, col. 2) NO YES YES
Observations 3,566 3,325 3,294
Notes:(1) Own production ratio for a food-group is the ratio of the imputed value
(using market prices) of home production as a fraction of total expenditure
on the item. (2) Standard errors are clustered at the village level
(3)Variable for “total food expenditure” has been transformed using an inverse
hyperbolic sine transformation. (4)*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15
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Table 3.10: Food Purchases of Different Food Groups and Women’s BMI
Independent Variable Dependent Variable-BMI
(1) (2) (3)
Purchase ratio-cereals 0.089 -0.194+ -0.192*
(Cluster-Robust p-Value) (0.792) (0.114) (0.085)
(Wild Bootstrap p-Value) (0.770) (0.138) (0.11)
Purchase ratio-fruits & veg. -0.49 -0.378 -0.453
(Cluster-Robust p-Value) (0.540) (0.490) (0.321)
(Wild Bootstrap p-Value) (0.557) (0.693) (0.511)
Purchase ratio-milk 0.258 -0.0349 0.0141
(Cluster-Robust p-Value) (0.400) (0.796) (0.899)
(Wild Bootstrap p-Value) (0.388) (0.837) (0.869)
Purchase ratio-other foods 1.794*/** 0.42 0.484
(Cluster-Robust p-Value) (0.057) (0.235) (0.168)
(Wild Bootstrap p-Value) (0.040) (0.184) (0.132)
Purchase ratio-pulses 0.474 0.473* 0.322*/+
(Cluster-Robust p-Value) (0.218) (0.057) (0.095)
(Wild Bootstrap p-Value) (0.222) (0.076) (0.128)
Overall expenditure share- cereals -0.999 1.494 0.469
Overall expenditure share- fruits & veg. -1.041 -0.385 -1.068
Overall expenditure share- milk 2.316 2.614 1.058
Overall expenditure share- other foods 0.331 1.659 1.405
Overall expenditure share- pulses -1.728 0.323 -0.956
Total food expenditure 0.978** -0.144 -0.0656
Age 0.252*** - -
Age Squared -0.00220* - -
Constant 2.416 19.89*** 20.01***
Year FE YES YES YES
Village FE YES YES YES
Individual FE NO YES YES
Extreme BMI Deviations Removed NO NO YES
Time Variant Controls (from Table 3.5, col. 2) NO YES YES
Observations 3,566 3,325 3,294
Notes: (1) Purchase ratio for a food-group is the ratio of the value of
food purchase as a fraction of total expenditure on the item.
(2) Standard errors are clustered at the village level
(3) Variable for “total food expenditure” has been transformed using an inverse
hyperbolic sine transformation. (4)*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15
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Table 3.11: Relationship between Child’s Weight-for-
Height & Mother’s BMI
Independent Variable Dependent Variable- WHZ
Mother’s BMI 0.0628*** 0.0660***
(Cluster-Robust p-Value) (0.005) (0.003)
(Wild Bootstrap p-Value) (0.010) (0.006)
Age in Months -0.00658 -0.00664
Sex -0.123 -0.129
Birth Order -0.00634 -0.00299
Mother’s Education 0.0115 0.011
Mother’s Age -0.0148 -0.0176
GVA/acre -0.0962 -0.104
Cultivated Area -0.00605 -0.00497
Ag. Sector Participation 1.348 1.423
Livestock Income 0.00824 0.00756
Non- Ag. Income 0.0203 0.0193
Unearned Income 0.0451*** 0.0449***
Ag. Labor Income -0.00537 -0.00726
Medical Expenditure 0.0528 0.0449
HH has Water 0.117 0.0952
HH has Toilet 0.0722 0.0544
Constant -2.417** -1.652*
Year FE YES YES
Village FE YES YES
Village Rainfall NO -0.00822
Observations 709 709
Notes: (1) Standard errors are clustered at the village level
(2) “GVA/acre” and all income variables
have been transformed using an inverse hyperbolic
sine transformation. (3) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15
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